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JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§IO.I. Supreme Judicial Court: Rejection of advisory opinions in 
subsequent Court decisions. For many years the Supreme Judicial 
Court has stated that in the decision of cases it did not consider itself 
bound by statements made by the Justices of the Court in the perfor-
mance of their constitutional duty to render advisory opinions. If an 
issue dealt with in an advisory opinion should come before the Court 
in a litigated case, the announced doctrine was that the Court would 
consider the issue afresh, without being influenced by the advisory 
opinion through the doctrine of stare decisis.1 
Over the years, however, the Court has invariably reached, in such 
cases, the same conclusions previously arrived at by the Justices in 
their advisory opinions.2 During the 1969 SURVEY year the Court finally 
decided a case upholding the validity of a statute enacted by the legis-
lature notwithstanding an advisory opinion that such a law would be 
in excess of the constitutional powers of the legislature.s 
In 1966 there was pending in the House of Representatives a bill to 
create a state agency which would be authorized to finance the con-
struction of housing projects designed to provide shelter for a "mix" 
of families of low income (who would, perforce, pay less than an eco-
nomic rent) and families of moderate income (who would pay eco-
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JIl., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and 
a member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia. and the Su-
preme Court of the United States. 
§10.1. 1 Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 1198, 177 N.E. 656 (1931). 
2 See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.4, at 109. 
B Massachusetts Housing FinanCe Agency v. New England Merchants National 
Bank. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 987. 249 N.E.2d 599. 
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nomic rents, the revenues from which might be large enough to offset 
the deficiencies in revenues collected from low income tenants, and 
thus provide a total or partial subsidy of the latter). 
The Justices ruled, in an advisory opinion,4' that use of public funds 
to carry out such operations would not be a use for a public purpose. 
Justice Kirk, in a separate opinion, indicated that he felt otherwise 
on the principle ,involved, but he declined to render an advisory opin-
ion because he read the questions submitted by the House as not ac-
curately keyed to the provisions of the bill. 
The legislature nonetheless enacted a statute creating the Massachu-
setts Housing Finance Agency and authorizing it to borrow money, on 
tax exempt notes, to lend to private developers to enable them to con-
struct and operate housing for low income and moderate income fam-
ilies as described above.1i The agency entered into contracts with 
various banks for purchase and sale of its notes, the agreements being 
conditioned upon, among other things, the constitutional permissibil-
ityof an undertaking by the Commonwealth in Section 9B(c) of the 
act to maintain, by appropriation, the agency's ability to meet debt 
service payments on its notes (which ability conceivably might become 
impaired if deficits in rental revenue left a developer-operator of a 
project unable to repay his loans from the agency). A suit was arranged 
between the agency and the banks for a declaratory judgment to ob-
tain resolution of the question of whether this condition of the con-
tracts had been met.6 The Court ruled that it had. 
Justice Cutter, writing for the Court, pointed out that the bill, as 
enacted, differed in many respects from the bill which had been sent 
over for the advisory opinion, so that the latter was not expressly re-
pudiated. The changes, however, amounted to no more than a filing 
down of some, though by no means all, of the rough spots in what had 
originally been an inartisti<::ally drawn bill. On the substantive point, 
the decision must be seen as completely at variance with what was 
said in the earlier advisory opinion. 
The public purpose issue, as the case points out, is more complex 
than the simplistic question whether public funds may be used to pro-
vide subsidized housing for others than those whose incomes are too 
low to enable them to pay a rental of full market value. There is, for 
example, the further question whether the legislature may properly 
conclude that legitimate public health and welfare objectives may be 
achieved by encouraging occupancy of housing facilities by families in 
different economic strata with the hope of thus deferring or minimiz-
ing the danger of deterioration of such facilities into substandard 
housing. 
The episode may suggest the advisability of giving some fresh con-
sideration to the practice of requiring the Justices to render advisory 
opinions upon request from the governor, the executive councilor a 
4 Opinion of the Justices, !l51 Mass. 716, 219 N.E.2d 18 (1966). 
1\ Acts of 1966, c. 708. 
6 G.l-., c. 2!11A. 
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house of the legislature. What may have been a workable, and even 
useful institution in 1780 is not necessarily suitable to the conditions 
found two centuries later. Legislation in a laissez-faire age was rather 
rare and aimed at simple problems. Court calendars were light and 
readily disposed of, and chief justices apparently did not mind the ad-
ditional chore of drafting the seldom-requested advisory opinions for 
the approval and signatures of their brethren.7 Today, however, the 
volume of appeals is close to overwhelming. In increasing numbers ap-
peals are disposed of summarily without full opinion. The rapid devel-
opment of constitutional doctrine, particularly on criminal matters, 
has brought the Court's once leisurely nisi prius docket to flood stage. 
Proposed legislation is directed more and more to involved social and 
economic problems. And the burden of the Justices is not lessened by 
the apparent legislative tendency to avoid coming to grips with con-
troversial bills by referring them for advisory opinions. 
As noted recently in these pages, the Justices have devised a partial 
solution to some of the problems involved by initiating a practice of 
inviting briefs from persons interested in some of the questions pro-
pounded to them.s This, however, is no more than a palliative. Pre-
sentations by persons with casual or academic interests lack the flavor 
of the adversary process, which provides the best motivation for thor-
ough presentation of all relevant considerations and is calculated to 
put the Court into the best possible position to deal with issues pre-
sented. 
The episode may also suggest that there are reasonably adequate al-
ternatives to the advisory opinion procedure. Where there is serious 
question of the constitutionality of a law after its enactment, it is not 
necessary that irreparable harm be suffered by someone before the is-
sue is determined. The Court has been very liberal in construing the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, and it is relatively easy, as in the situation 
under consideration here, to frame a contract so as to generate a de-
claratory judgment proceeding for speedy clarification of the problem. 
This device has been used for the resolution of doubts in several socio-
economic areas in recent years.9 It can be adapted to other areas.10 
7 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960). This re-
counts a conversation with Chief Justice Wilkins of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, in which the Chief Justice spoke of a custom of composition of 
advisory opinions by chief justices. It is not clear whether the Chief Justice was 
referring to the then (1960 or earlier) current practice in the Court, or if he was 
describing the practice of his predecessors. In any event, it is clearly manifest that, 
given the increasingly numerous and complex requests for advisory opinions, a 
chief justice cannot be expected to shoulder the whole burden of processing 
them, in addition to carrying out his judicial and administrative duties. Of 
necessity, the drafting of these opinions is a task which must now be distributed 
among the members of the Court. 
s 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.!I, at 197. 
9 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Boston Safe Deposit &: Trust 
Co., 348 Mass. 538, 205 N.E.2d !l46 (1965); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Commissioner 
of Banks, !!49 Mass. 214, 207 N.E.2d 51 (1965); Dodge v. Prudential Ins. Co., !!4!1 
Mass. !l75, 179 N.E.2d 234 (1961). 
10 See Zwickler v. Koota, !l89 U.S. 241 (1967) (approving use of deClaratory 
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The full extent of the availability of alternatives to the advisory opin-
ion deserves exploration. 
§lO.2. Obscenity law: Vagueness of constitutional standards. The 
constitutional status and applicability of the obscenity law1 have not 
been substantially clarified since the subject was discussed in these 
pages two years ago. Cases which came up during the 1969 SURVEY 
year have perhaps raised more questions than they have answered. 
In two of the cases,2 involving convictions for sales of various mag-
azines, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions with a re-
script opinion in each case reciting simply: "There was no error in the 
trial and convictions of the defendant[s] on two of [the] complaints un-
der G.L., c. 272, §28A." 
The reports leave unclear precisely what issues the Court passed 
upon. The printed records in the cases, which do not include the mag-
azines (under the local practice these are trial exhibits, subject to ex-
amination upon appeal), leave unclear just what the obscenity con-
sisted of, e.g., whether it was "hard core pornography" under the stan-
dards of the RothS and Fanny Hill4 cases, or borderline publications 
losing constitutional protection by reason of a "pandering" merchan-
dising technique such as was controlling in Ginzburg v. United States./) 
The briefs on appeal made some point as to the element of scienter, 
but the Court had already interpreted the statute to be read as though 
it contained the word "knowingly," as qualifying the conduct de-
nounced therein.6 In one of the cases, application for certiorari was 
made to the Supreme Court of the United States, but the petition was 
denied.7 
The uncertainty as to the applicable standards was not diminished 
by the Supreme Court's disposition of another magazine case. The 
New York Court of Appeals, also without an explanatory opinion, 
affirmed a conviction for a sale in violation of the obscenity law of 
that state.s On November 17, 1969, the Supreme Court granted certio-
judgment procedure to determine constitutional validity of criminal statute 
whereby contestant would be relieved of risk of undergoing criminal trial). This 
is something of a variant of the more familiar use or the injunctive process to 
restrain enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law. See Ex parte Young. 
209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
§10.2. 1 G.L .• c. 272. §28A. 
2 Commonwealth v. Calabrese. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 450. 245 N.E.2d 41!l; Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 824, 247 N.E.2d 698, cert. denied, 396 
u.S. 990 (1969). 
S Roth v. United States, !l54 U.S. 476 (1957). 
4 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney 
General, !l8!l U.S. 413 (1966), cited as Fanny Hill, noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §1l.2. 
/) !l83 U.S. 46!l (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1l.2. 
6Demetropoulos v. Commonwealth, !l42 Mass. 658, 175 N.E.2d 259 (1961). 
7 Johnson v. Massachusetts, !l96 U.s. 990 (1969). Justices Black and Douglas voted 
to grant certiorari and reverse summarily. 
8 People v. Carlos,24 N.Y.2d 865, 248 N.E.2d 924 (1969). 
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rari9 but revoked the grant on the same day.l0 Three weeks later it 
again granted the writ and summarily reversed,11 citing Redrup v. 
New York.12 As noted in these pages at the time, Redrup, and the sum-
mary decisions coming after it, do little by way of offering guidelines 
for determining which publications are constitutionally protected. 
It may be questioned whether the obscurity of the Supreme Court's 
reasons for its disposition of obscenity cases is best met by comparably 
cryptic statements of a state court's reasons for decisions in such cases. 
Earlier in the 1969 SURVEY year, in another constitutional area, the 
Supreme Judicial Court, while deploring the failure of the Supreme 
Court of the United States to announce precise standards for allow-
ance or disallowance of claims of privilege against sel£-incrimination,13 
proceeded to articulate its reasons for concluding that a particular 
claim of privilege was not well taken.14 
In another case, the Court dealt less summarily with a conviction 
for presenting a film entitled Fanny Hill Meets Dr. Erotico.1I1 The 
brief rescript recited the familiar triple standard: "The film is ob-
scene. Its dominant theme as a whole appeals solely to a prurient 
interest in sex; it is patently offensive, an affront to contemporary 
community standards regarding sexual matters; and it is utterly with-
out redeeming social value." The italicizing of "utterly" was probably 
designed to forestall reopening of the Pandora's box which erupted 
when the Fanny Hill book case was in litigation. There, neither the 
trial judge nor the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court found any 
redeeming social value in the book. In substance, the majority opin-
ion said merely that even if the book had social value, it was not 
significant enough to offset the objectionable features.16 When the Su-
preme Court reversed, three Justices (perhaps four) assumed that 
9 Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 926 (1969). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969). Perhaps the greatest significance of this 
case lies in the fact that Chief Justice Burger dissented (with Justice Harlan) and 
aligned himself with the latter on the point advanced in Roth, note 3 supra 354 U.S. 
at 496 (separate opinion), and Fanny Hill, note 4 supra, 383 U.S. at 455, that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process tolerates a greater degree of state regulation 
of publication than the First Amendment would allow the United States. These 
two justices would have denied certiorari but, since the majority decided to grant 
the writ, they would have affirmed summarily the decision below. 
12386 U.S. 767 (1967), noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.5, at 106. 
18 The Court referred to what is considered elusive standards set forth for deter-
mining whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was 
appropriately claimed in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.s. 479 (1951). The same 
standards are applicable in state proceedings under Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
141969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 331, 245 N.E.2d 246. 
15 Commonwealth v. State Amusement Corp., 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1003, 248 
N.E.2d 497. 
16 Attorney General v. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman 
of Pleasure," 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965). 
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there was at least some literary or social merit in the book, and con-
cluded that this made it constitutionally protected. 
Whether the issue of a book's or a film's endowment or nonendow-
ment with literary merit or "redeeming social value" presents a ques-
tion of fact or of law, or a mixed question of both, has not been 
resolved. Nor is there anything like a clear answer to the stickier 
question whether the issue is to be resolved on the basis of testimony 
given by "experts," or by a judicial "intuition of experience"17 in re-
action to the publication or picture. 
Some answers may be forthcoming in the decision of a case which 
is pending on appeal at the present writing. In a prosecution for ex-
hibition of an erotic film entitled I Am Curious (Yellow), the chief 
justice of the superior court prefaced his findings of guilty with a 
lengthy opinion.18 The film is heavily larded with scenes of nudity 
and explicit graphic displays of various forms of sexual intercourse. 
Several defense witnesses testified as to social values of the film and re-
buttal witnesses for the Commonwealth testified to the contrary. As to 
these, the chief justice said: 
Presented with divergent analyses of "I Am Curious (Yellow)," 
predicated on contradictory expert testimony, I am not bound to 
accept the testimony of any witness or group of witnesses. Other-
wise, the expression of the professed views of a small number of 
partisan witnesses could oust the trial judge from his traditional 
function. 
I do not find the testimony of the defense witnesses persuasive, 
and, insofar as the law permits, I reject it.19 
The opinion went on to question the "utterly without redeeming 
social value" factor of legal obscenity. The argument ran to the effect 
that the requirement of this factor for a finding of obscenity is not 
really Supreme Court doctrine, since it was primarily announced in 
an opinion subscribed to by but three members of the full court.20 
17 Chicago, Burlington Be Quincy R.R. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907). The 
epigram was made by Justice Holmes to describe the process by which assessors 
may properly arrive at certain of their conclusions. 
18 Commonwealth v. Karalexis, Nos. 4S068 Cr.-4S071 Cr. (Suffolk. County Ct. 
1969). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Fanny Hill, S8S U.S. 41S (1966). There was no opinion of the Court. Justice 
Brennan delivered the lead opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Fortas. Justices Black and Stewart concurred in the result on the grounds set 
forth in their respective . dissenting opinions in the companion cases, Ginzburg 
v. United States, S8S U.s. 46S (1966), and Mishkin v. New York, SSS U.s. 518 
(1966). Justice Douglas also concurred in an opinion which assumed that the 
book. had a "social value." Justices Clark, Harlan and White dissented in separate 
opinions. The superior court's doctrinal conclusion from its fragmentation of the 
Supreme Court's decision inspired Judge Aldrich, in dealing with the same film, 
to the earthy comment, "If we may be pardoned the analogy, if deuces are wild, 
an inside straight flush and a deuce takes the pot." Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 
1363 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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However, as the opinion also noted, the doctrine has been accepted 
as binding by the Supreme Judicial Court.21 The Chief Justice found 
that the film is utterly without redeeming social value. 
What might be called the "facade doctrine" with respect to redeem-
ing social value was also adverted to in the opinion. This doctrine was 
epitomized by Judge Friendly in a special concurrence with a decision 
holding this film not obscene under the customs laws: "[A] truly por-
nographic film would not be rescued by inclusion of a few verses from 
the Psalms."22 While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con-
cluded that this proposition was not relevant, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals recently reached the opposite result.23 The Massachusetts 
opinion offers an extension of this concept in the following language: 
(T]o restore some degree of rationality to the element of "social 
value" as set forth in Roth, the deliberate use of the term "re-
deeming" should be given due weight. Roth's repudiation of the 
doctrine of Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868) that the ob-
scenity of a work cannot be judged according to isolated excerpts 
implies that neither should an otherwise pornographic work be 
redeemed by a similar consideration of isolated passages of min-
imal social value.24 
This thought is advanced, it must be remembered, on the premise that 
complete absence of social value is not a requisite of denying constitu-
tional protection to a publication. 
Another view of the constitutional status of I Am Curious (Yellow) 
was advanced by a divided United States District Court of three judges 
which issued an injunction against further prosecutions of the exhibit-
ors of the film.211 The majority felt that the substantive issue was gov-
erned by Stanley v. Georgia,26 which held that possession of obscene 
pictures held for the personal delectation of the possessor was consti-
tutionally protected. The film, so the argument runs, is known (by 
reason of exclusion of minors from the theatre) to be offensive; those 
who go to view it are willing to be exposed to it; collectively they have 
the same right to this sort of delectation as does an individual Stanley. 
The opinion of the court asserts, without documentation, that a nec-
essary corollary of Stanley is that a producer or distributor of por-
21 Attorney General v. A Book Named "Naked Lunch," lI51 Mass. 298, 218 
N.E.2d 517 (1966). 
22 United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I am Curious - Yellow," 404 
F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Valentine v. Chrestensen, lII6 U.S. 52 (1942) 
(commercial circular is not transformed. into constitutionally protected publication 
by having patriotic platitude appended to it). 
23Wagonheim v. Maryland State Board of Censors,-Md.-, 258 A.2d 240 
(1969), cert granted sub. nom. Grove Press, Inc. v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 
- U.S. - (1970). 
24 Commonwealth v. Karalexis, Nos. 43068 Cr.-43071 Cr. (Suffolk County Ct. 
1969). 
211 Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), cert. granted, - U.S. 
- (1970). 
26 lI94 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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nographic materials has (under First Amendment principles?) rights 
coextensive with those of the reader or viewer (which may be deter-
mined as much by constitutional or principles of privacy as by prin-
ciples of the freedoms of speech and press). On the other hand, the 
court does not make clear why the advertising of the film, having the 
effect which the court attributes to it, does riot fall within the "pan-
dering" restriction of Ginzburg v. United States.27 ' 
On December 15, 1969, these questions were, at least temporarily, 
rendered academic. The Supreme Court stay~d the district court's in-
junction, pending the taking of an appeal by the prosecutor, and, if 
such appeal is taken, pending its ultimate disposition.28 Whether the 
stay was motivated by doubts of the propriety of federal court inter-
vention in state criminal proceedings,29 doubts as to the standing of 
the plaintiffs to raise the issues considered by the district court, doubts 
as to the correctness of the extension of the Stanley doctrine, doubts as 
to the jurisdiction of the district court to decide the case on an issue 
narrower than that of the constitutionality of the statute (as distinct 
from the constitutionality of its specific application),SO or some other 
doubt, cannot be known at least until (and unless) the Supreme Court 
passes upon the merits of the appeal. 
§lO.3 Sexually dangerous persons statute. The story of Leroy 
Peterson and of his litigation over the sexually dangerous persons law1 
was told in these pages last year.2 The final chapter of the story, how-
ever, had to be compressed into a footnote inserted while the volume 
was in the press.8 
While Petetson was serving a prison term for assault with a danger-
ous weapon, proceedings were instituted looking to his commitment 
as a sexually dangerous person. After trial in the superior court he 
was ordered committed. Judgment was affirmed on appeal,4 and cer-
tiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.1S Col-
lateral attacks upon the judgment were brought first in the United 
States District Court, which dismissed for failure to exhaust state rem-
edies,6 then in the Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed on the 
27888 U.S. 468 (1966). 
28 Byrne v. Karalexis. 896 U.S. 976 (1969). 
29 The act. 28 U.S.C. §2288. forbidding federal courts to issue injunctions to 
stay proceedings in state coutts. might be applicable. as the federal action was 
commenced after a state indictment had been returned. That indictment. how-
ever. was quashed. and the state conviction was had under a subsequent indictment. 
Commonwealth v. Karalexis. Nos. 48668 Cr.-48071 Cr. (Suffolk County Ct. 1969). See 
Dombrowski v. Pfister. 8SO U.S. 479 (1965); Zwickler v. Koota. 889 U.S. 241 (1967). 
80 See Douglas v. Jeannette. 819 U.s. 157 (1948). 
§10.1I. 1 G.L .• c. 12M. 
21968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.2. at 190. 
8Id. at 197. n.29. 
4 Commonwealth v. Peterson. 848 Mass. 702. 205 N.E.2d 719 (1965). noted in 
1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.9. 
IS Peterson v. Massachusetts. 884 U.S. 909 (1966). 
6 Peterson v. Gaughan. Superintendent. Misc. Civ. No. 66-88-C (D. Mass .• memo-
randum of June 19, 1967). 
8
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merits.7 The federal case was reactivated, and the district court reached 
the same conclusion as had the state court.8 
Perhaps the principal issue in the case grew out of the fact that a 
substantial amount of the evidence against Peterson at his trial was 
hearsay. Counsel made a timely objection, but the court admitted the 
material de bene esse, and no motion to strike was subsequently made. 
The Supreme Judicial Court and the district court, invoking the fa-
miliar rule that inadmissible evidence admitted without appropriate 
objection being perfected may have probative effect, decided that there 
was no fatal error. 
These decisions were criticized here9 on the ground that the courts 
had failed to address themselves to the question whether Peterson had 
a constitutional, not merely an evidentiary, right to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, although the commitment proceedings were 
"civil," rather than "criminal," and if so, whether the right had been 
effectively waived. 
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit it was 
held10 that the Supreme Court's decision in SPecht v. Patterson,11 while 
the case is distinguishable on its facts, establishes that a commitment 
proceeding against one charged with sexual deviation must be at-
tended with the elements of due process of law traditionally required 
in conventional criminal proceedings. One of these elements is the 
right of confrontation. The court of appeals proceeded, however, to 
rule that on the facts disclosed by the record - the conditional admis-
sion of the hearsay, the known availability of a motion to strike, and 
particularly the fact that the trial judge told counsel that he would be 
allowed to file any motion he thought appropriate - it must be con-
cluded that Peterson's counsel had intelligently waived his right of 
confrontation. 
This conclusion is supported only by citation of one case in which 
the Supreme Court laid down the generalization that, "A waiver [of 
fundamental constitutional rights] is ordinarily an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."12 No 
reference is made to subsequent cases in which this principle was sub-
stantially refined. Thus, it has been indicated that mere nonexercise 
of a known right does not necessarily constitute a waiver,1s and that 
failure to claim a known right does not amount to a waiver unless it 
is found that the failure is a deliberate and purposeful trial strategy.14 
Furthermore, there is an as yet uncharted area within which rights 
7 Peterson, petitioner, 354 Mass. HO, 236 N.E.2d 82 (1968). 
8 Peterson v. Gaughan, 285 F. Supp. 377 (D. Mass. 1968). 
9 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §72, at 196. 
10 Peterson v. Gaughan, 404 F.2d 1375 (1st Cir. 1968). In addition to ruling on 
the confrontation issue, the decision also reviewed and sustained the determi-
nations that the statute was not void for vagueness and that it did not den, 
equal protection of the laws. 
11 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
12 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
18 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-440 (1963). 
14 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 u.s. 443, 449-452 (1965). 
9
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may be waived only by the individual concerned and cannot be waived 
by counsel.lII 
As far as the Peterson litigation is concerned, this issue was rendered 
academic, as Peterson was released from custody shortly after the 
Court's decision, and no further proceeedings were undertaken in the 
case. 
§10.4. Habeas corpus: Right to be heard unaffected by time. The 
case of Chin Kee v. Massachusetts,1 decided during the 1969 SURVEY 
year, hinged upon an issue not likely to be presented again. It never-
theless deserved mention in an account of constitutional developments 
because it stands as striking proof that in fact, not merely in theory, 
the passage of time does not wipe out the right of a convicted person 
to be heard on the merits of a claim that his conviction grew out of 
an invasion of constitutionally protected right. 
In 1932 Chin Kee was convicted in the superior court of murder in 
the first degree. The following year the judgment against him was 
affirmed.2 The death sentence, originally imposed, was commuted to 
life imprisonment. Thirty-five years later he was allowed to raise for 
the first time, the contention that his trial had been wanting in due 
process of law. 
It appeared that at the time of Chin Kee's arraignment under the 
murder indictment he was not represented by counsel. He pleaded 
not guilty, and subsequently an attorney was designated to represent 
him at the trial. At the time, the law of Massachusetts was to the effect 
that a general plea to an indictment constituted a waiver of any right 
to plead matters in abatement of the indictment.s After it was deter-
mined, many years later, that the right to the assistance of counsel in 
state criminal proceedings is a right of constitutional dimension,4 
Chin Kee conceived that the state's failure to provide him with such 
assistance at his arraignment was a deprivation of his constitutionally 
protected rights. 
On a petition for writ of error, the Supreme Judicial Court denied 
relief.1> It pointed out that there was no showing that there had been 
111 Brookhart v. Janis, 884 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). 
§10.4. 1407 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1969). 
2 Commonwealth v. Chin Kee, 288 Mass. 248, 186 N.E.2d 58 (1988). No point 
was made in this appeal with reference to the timing of the assignment of counsel 
for the defendant. In fact, the relevant statute appears to contemplate that counsel 
is to be assigned after the accused pleads to the indictment, G.L., c. 277, §47. 
3 Commonwealth v. Blake, 94 Mass. 188 (1866); but see Commonwealth v. Harris, 
281 Mass. 584, 121 N.E. 409 (1919). The rule became largely a matter of historical 
interest in 1964, when the superior Court adopted its Rule lOlA, expressly over-
ruling the doctrine that a plea waives matter in abatement. Since 1965, pleas 
in abatement in criminal cases have been abolished, and matter in abatement 
is presented by motion to dismiss, with supporting affidavits, where appropriate, 
G.L., c. 277, §47A. 
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 885 (196!1); Hamilton v. Alabama, 868 U.S. 
52 (1961); White v. Maryland 878 u.s. 59 (1968). 
I> Chin Kee v. Commonwealth, 854 Mass. 156, 285 N.E.2d 787 (1968). 
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any matter in abatement, and it inferred from the diligence and com-
petence of trial counsel as reflected in the record and from his failure 
to offer to show such matter that there had been in fact no basis for 
a plea in abatement. The conclusion was that if, in fact, hindsight 
would show the failure to assign counsel at the time of arraignment 
to have been error, it was "harmless." 
Chin Kee then addressed a petition to the United States District 
Court. Counsel was appointed, and a petition for federal habeas cor-
pus was heard and denied on the basis of the opinion of the Supreme 
Judicial Court.6 Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit affirmed.7 Its approach differed somewhat from that 
of the state court. Both courts start with the premise, mandated by the 
Supreme Court,S that an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel 
at every "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding. The court of appeals 
focused upon the question whether an arraignment was such a stage 
in Massachusetts in 1932. Pointing out that the right to plead in abate-
ment was not, in any circumstances, an unqualified right, and that, 
even under the law as it stood at that time, a judge had discretionary 
power to entertain a plea in abatement after a general plea had been 
entered, the court concluded that the arraignment of Chin Kee had 
been a "marginally" critical stage of the prosecution against him. This 
refinement was relevant to the question of how much must be shown 
to convince the reviewing court "beyond a reasonable doubt"9 that the 
deprivation of constitutional right was harmless. The court concluded 
that the Commonwealth had shown enough by establishing that indus-
trious trial counsel had not invoked the court's discretion to consider 
any matter in abatement and by pointing out that there was no pres-
ent suggestion that there was in fact matter which could have been 
pleaded in abatement. 
On June 23, 1969, the last chapter in the long litigation was written 
when the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari which sought 
clarification of the reasonable doubt standard by which courts in post-
conviction proceedings are to distinguish harmless deprivations of con-
stitutional rights from those which are more noxious.1o 
§IO.5. Miscellaneous decisions. Another "loyalty oath" problem 
arose during the 1969 SURVEY year. A statute1 requires public employ-
ees to take the following oath: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of 
America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
6 Chin Kee v. Massachusetts, Civ. No. 68-41-M (D. Mass., Aug I, 1968). 
7 Chin Kee v. Massachusetts, 407 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1969). 
S Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
9 Chapman v. California, 386 U.s. 18 (1967) announced that, where a depriva-
tion of constitutional right has been established, the state has the burden of 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. 
10 Chin Kee v. Massachusetts, 395 U.S. 982 (1969). 
§10.5. 1 C.L., c. 2611, §14. 
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and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United 
States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by 
any illegal or unconstitutional method." 
A federal district court of three judges held that the "uphold and 
defend" clause of the oath was not objectionable, but that the "oppose 
the overthrow" clause contained a too vague description of the obliga-
tion required to be taken by employees.2 It was not clear to the court 
whether the employee would undertake simply not to participate in 
violent or illegal subversion, or to take positive action against subver-
sive activity by others. 
In sustaining the "uphold and defend" part of the oath, the court 
relied upon a decision of another federal district courtS sustaining a 
statute requiring teachers (among others) to subscribe to an oath to 
"support" the constitution. The latter decision was affirmed per cu-
riam by the Supreme Court of the United States.4 
In the Knight case there was involved an oath identical in form to 
the oath required of teachers by a Massachusetts statute. II It pledged 
not only support of the constitutions, but also went on to recite, "I 
will faithfully discharge the duties of the position of (insert name of 
position) according to the best of my ability." The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the quoted language, at least as required of teachers 
in private schools, is unconstitutionally vague.6 The Court went on 
to say that the "faithfully discharge" clause of the oath was not sep-
arable from the "support" clause. The federal court which decided the 
Knight case explicitly refused to follow the reasoning of the Massachu-
setts court. 
The Commonwealth has taken an appeal, contending that the "op-
pose the overthrow" clause of the oath is not objectionably vague.7 
One can only speculate, at this point, whether the case will be con-
sidered as raising the question not reached in Pedolsky: Is a required 
pledge to support or defend the constitutions subject to the "over-
breadth" objections which have been fatal to "negative oaths," in 
which the employee was required to disclaim present or past member-
ship in subversive organizations?8 
Another federal district court decision should be noted here, al-
though it involves a matter of national rather than state law. In 
United States v. Sisson,9 the court placed the right ofa conscientious 
2 Richardson v. Cole. 800 F. Supp. 1821 (D. Mass. 1969). judgment vacated and 
case remanded. 88 U.s.L.W. 8862 (U.s. Mar. 17. 1970). 
S Knight v. Board of Regents. 269 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
4 Knight v. Board of Regents. 890 U.s. 86 (1967). 
II G.L.. c. 71. §80A. 
8 Pedolsky v •. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 852 Mass. 127. 224 N.E.2d 
414 (1967). noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.2. 
7Cole v. Richardson. No. 679 (October Term. 1969). , 
8 See. e.g .• Baggett v. Bullitt. 877 U.S. 860 (1964). The Supreme Court remanded 
the case to determine whether it has become moot. 88 U.S.L.W. 8862 (U.S. Mar. 17. 
1970). 
9297 F. Supp. 902. (D. Mass. 1969). 
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objector to exemption from compulsory military service on a consti-
tutional, rather than a statutory basis. In United States v. Seeger10 the 
Supreme Court had construed the then applicable statute exempt-
ing conscientious objectors as covering those whose objections were 
grounded on purely ethical principles as well as those whose objec-
tions grew out of religious conviction. Congress amended the statute 
so as to confine the exemption to one, "who, by reason of religious 
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war 
in any form."l1 Sisson was found to be, by reason of ethical conviction, 
not religious training and belief, opposed to participation in the Viet-
nam conflict. After a jury found him guilty of refusal to submit to in-
duction into the armed services pursuant to the Selective Service Act, 
the court granted a motion to arrest judgment, ruling that the limita-
tion of the exemption in the amended statute violated both the "free 
execrise of religion" clause and the "establishment of religion" clause 
of the First Amendment. 
The government has taken a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, 
seeking to argue that exemption from combat service may be limited 
to (a) those whose conscientious objections stem from religious roots, 
and (b) those whose conscientious objection is to all war, not merely 
selected wars. Conceivably, these issues will not be reached, and the 
case could go off on a jurisdictional point. The court postponed the 
jurisdictional question until argument on the merits,12 evidently hav-
ing some doubt whether the granting of a motion to arrest judgment 
was tantamount to entering judgment in favor of the defendant non 
obstante veredicto, a ruling from which the statutes do not provide 
appeal to the Supreme Court.13 
In another criminal case the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
constitutionally protected right to the assistance of counsel at the time 
of sentencing14 does not include a right to have the contents of a pre-
sentencing probation officer's report made available for inspection by 
counsel for the defendant.15 This, as the opinion of the Court doc-
uments, .is an issue upon which the authorities are divided. Perhaps 
the numerical weight of authority tends to the view that the disclosure 
of any or all of the contents of the report lies in the discretion of the 
presiding judge.16 In jurisdictions where disclosure of the contents of 
the report is required, this generally is the result of a judgment that 
10 !l80 U.s. 16!1 (1965). 
11 Pub. L. No. 90-40, §1(7), 50 U.S.C. App. §456(j) (1967). 
12 United States v. Sisson, !l96 U.S. 812 (1969). 
1318 U.s.C. §!l7!11 sets forth the criteria for direct appeals to the Supreme Court 
in criminal cases. If the Supreme Court should rule that a direct appeal does 
not lie, but that an appeal would lie to a court of appeals, the case could be 
remanded to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
14 Mempa v. Rhay, !l89 U.s. 128 (1967). 
15 Commonwealth v. Martin, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 215, 244 N.E.2d lIOll. 
16 Rule lI2(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states, in substance, 
the standard generally followed. 
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such procedure makes for sound administration of criminal justice, 
rather than of a feeling of constitutional compulsion.1T 
The sticky problem of a public employee's duty to answer questions 
put to him by his superior in connection with the performance of his 
duties was considered in Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of 
Boston.18 The petitioner was a policeman who was called to his cap-
tain's office and questioned with respect to his appearance as a witness 
before the grand jury. A number of persons, including three police-
men, were indicted by the grand jury in connection with motor vehi-
cle thefts. Silverio declined to state whether he had been questioned 
by the grand jury about the thefts or whether he had refused to an-
swer grand jury questions on the ground of privilege against self-in-
crimination. For the refusals he was discharged. Had the discharge 
been based upon a claim of constitutional privilege,19 or had it been 
based upon answers given in reaction to a threat to discharge unless 
the employee waived his privilege again self-incrimination,2o it would 
have been unlawful. As the Court pointed out, however, the refusal 
to answer the questions put was not within the privilege, and, since 
the questions were relevant to the officer's duties of law enforcement 
(some of them were as to his acquaintance with certain persons who 
may have been involved in the thefts) refusal to answer was a proper 
ground of discharge. The Supreme Court of the United States denied 
certiorari.21 
The final case to be noted is Commonwealth v. Haseotes.22 This case 
grew out of the statute23 which requires retailers selling prepackaged 
meat, poultry or edible fish to provide their outlets with computing 
scales and to reweigh any such prepackaged food at the request of a 
prospective customer. This was found to be a reasonable requirement 
calculated to protect consumers against fraud, accident, carelessness or 
mistake which might lead to their being overcharged by being given 
less food than the label indicates. As to application of the statute to 
prepackaged food from out-of-state sources, the Court concluded that 
the cost of the scales to weigh such foods did not impose an appreci-
able burden in interstate commerce in such foods. After examining the 
various federal laws dealing with the processing, packing, marking and 
labeling of the kinds of food products involved, together with the im-
plementing agency rules and regulations, the Court concluded that 
17 See the majority and dissenting opinions in State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128,259 A.2d 
895, !l8 U.S.L.W. 2402 (1969). The majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
takes a position substantially similar to the proposal in the American Law In-
stitute Model Penal Code §7.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Essentially. 
the reports are to be shown to counsel after being screened by the trial judge 
and edited as may be necessary to protect sources of confidential information. 
18 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 247 N.E.2d !l79. 
19 Gardner v. Broderick. !l92 U.S. 27!1 (1968). 
20 Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation. !l92 U.S. 280 (1968). 
21 Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston. !l96 U.S. 878 (1969). 
22 Commonwealth v. Haseotes,. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1O!I!I. 249 N.E.2d 6!19. 
23 G.L., c. 98, §56B. 
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there had not been federal preemption of the area of such magnitude 
as to preclude state legislation requiring provision of computer scales 
to verify the label recitals of weight and price. 
B. STVDENT COMMENT 
§lO.6. Free speech: Invasion of privacy: Commonwealth v. Wise-
man.1 The respondent, Frederick Wiseman, is a noted producer of 
educational and documentary films. In 1965, he sought permission 
from the commissioner of correction and the superintendent, Massa-
chusetts Correctional Institution, Bridgewater, to make a documentary 
film at Bridgewater. The commissioner and the superintendent denied 
his initial request, but in January of 1966 they relented, provided that 
such permission was within their authority (as determined by the at-
torney general of the Commonwealth) and provided further that cer-
tain specific requirements designed to protect the interests of the 
inmates were met.2 
In March of 1966, the attorney general (Edward Brooke) advised the 
superintendent, that if he deemed it advisable, then he could permit 
Wiseman to make his film at Bridgewater. 
Permission was then granted and Wiseman began filming at the in-
stitution in April of 1967. After completion, in June of 1967, the film, 
which had been entitled Titicut Follies, was shown to the superinten-
dent and the attorney general (Elliot Richardson). In September of 
that year, the attorney general notified Mr. Wiseman and his legal 
advisers "that in his opinion the film constituted an invasion of the 
privacy of the inmates shown in the film; that mentally incompetent 
patients were shown . . . and that the releases, if any, obtained by 
Wiseman, were not valid."3 The commissioner first saw the film in 
September, and on September 21, 1967, he notified the respondent that 
the film could not be shown in its "present form."4 
Notwithstanding these objections by the attorney general of the 
Commonwealth, the commissioner of correction, and the superinten-
dent of the institution, Wiseman proceeded to contract with Grove 
Press, Inc. for the public distribution of the film as made. 
The superintendent and the commissioner of correction as parens 
patriae, brought suit on behalf of inmates pictured in the film on the 
§10.6. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 249 N.E.2d 610, petition for cert. filed 38 
V.SL.W. 3102, No. 621 (U.S. Sept. 18, 1969). 
2 The superior court found that Wiseman was permitted to make the film on 
the following conditions: "(a) that 'the rights of the inmates and patients [would 
be] fully protected: (b) that there would be used only 'photographs of inmates 
and patients . . . legally competent to sign releases: (c) that a written release 
would be obtained 'from each patient whose photograph is used in the film: and 
(d) that the film would not be released 'without first having been . . . approved 
by the Commissioner [of Correction] and Superintendent [of Bridgewater]:" Id. 
at 1056, 249 N.E.2d at 612. 
31969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1057. 249 N.E.2d at 613. 
4 Ibid. 
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theories of breach of contract and invasion of privacy. The trial (:ourt 
found that respondent had violated the tenns of the agreement on 
which petitioners had allowed him to make the film, and that the film 
was an invasion of the inmates' privacy. Petitioners were granted an 
injunction banning all showings of Titicut Follies. Respondent ap-
pealed to the Supreme Judicial Court claiming primarily that the 
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment precludes the 
granting of such an injunction. The Court HELD: The film was an 
invasion of the inmates' privacy; that in making it Wiseman had 
breached the contract; that its subject was not a matter of public con-
cern protected by the First Amendment; but that the good of showing 
it to "professional audiences"G would outweigh any possible hann. 
The Court based its decree denying the general public access to 
Titicut Follies in small part on the breach of contract which the trial 
court found as fact, and in large part on the invasion of privacy which 
it found from its own viewing of the film. That part of the decree 
allowing professional audiences to see the film is based on a public 
interest in having these people aware of conditions at Bridgewater and 
similar institutions. This public interest is said to outweigh any pri-
vate hann done to the inmates. 
The Wiseman case reviewed the following issues: the standing of 
the Commonwealth to maintain the action, the propriety of equitable 
relief from invasion of privacy, and most important, the conflicting 
claims of the public to be infonned and of the individual to preserve 
his privacy. 
It seems clear that the Commonwealth itself would have no standing 
to maintain this action. It is true that the Commonwealth made the 
contract which it alleged was breached; but it did so on behalf of the 
inmates of Bridgewater. The contract was designed to serve a personal 
rather than a material interest, to protect the rights of the inmates 
and in particular not to realize a financial gain.6 Therefore the equit-
able remedy of an injunction, rather than the legal remedy of dam-
ages, was sought by the Commonwealth. 
The interest for which protection was sought - privacy - was in 
the inmates of Bridgewater and not in the Commonwealth. Wiseman 
contended that the true interest of the Commonwealth was in protect-
ing its own reputation as custodian, and as such was adverse to the 
interests of the inmates; that the Commonwealth was interested in 
suppressing a report of conditions at Bridgewater at the expense of 
those suffering under those conditions:r Whatever truth his contention 
may have had, it is not significant. The Commonwealth may well have 
had a selfish motive in bringing the action, but its motive must be kept 
II Specifically, "legislators, judges, lawyers. sociologists, social workers, doctors, 
psychiatrists, students in these or related fields, and organizations dealing with 
the social problems of custodial care .and mental infirmity." Id. at 1065, 249 N.E.2d 
at 618. 
6 See note 2 supra. 
or Brief for Respondents at 44·46. 
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distinct from its action. It acted for the inmates. The inmates have a 
personal right of privacy,8 which, as a personal right, may properly 
be protected by a court of equity.9 There was a serious question as to 
whether that privacy had been invaded. 
The right to maintain an action for invasion of privacy lies in the 
victim only.l0 The victims here are inmates of a state institution. The 
legislature provided a comprehensive system for the care of incompe-
tentsll in the exercise of its power as parens patriae.12 The duty to 
care for and control such persons was delegated by the legislature to 
the commissioner of correction and the superintendent at Bridge-
water.1S With that duty passed the corresponding duty to protect the 
interests of the inmates at Bridgewater;14 and, where there is a duty 
to protect, a fortiori there must be a corresponding power. The in-
mates, who have so little freedom to act, have no power to protect 
themselves in a situation such as this. That responsibility lies with 
those who restrict their actions. Custody gives rise to responsibility; 
the power a person would have had to act in his own best interests 
passes, upon his commitment to Bridgewater, into the hands of his 
custodians, so that they may fulfill this responsibility. Insofar as it acts 
on behalf of the inmates at Bridgewater, the Commonwealth would 
have standing to seek injunctive relief in a collective suit. 
Equitable relief from wrongs to the person is an outgrowth of eq-
uitable relief from wrongs to property. It originated with the land-
mark case of Gee v. Pritchard.1G In that case the plaintiff, a widow, 
had taken the defendant into her home and raised him as her son, at 
the request of her husband. Her husband died leaving defendant a 
large share of his property; but defendant was dissatisfied with his 
inheritance. He proposed to publish personal and confidential letters 
which he had received from his stepmother. To prevent this, she ob-
tained an injunction. In denying a motion to dissolve the injunction, 
the chancellor explicitly denied that he was doing so "because the let-
ters are written in confidence, or because the publication of them may 
wound the feelings of the Plaintiff .... "16 He based his decision on a 
property interest of plaintiff in the letters, which defendant's publica-
tion of them would violate. Clearly the real wrong is to plaintiff's feel-
ings and not to her property. It was a case of saying one thing and 
8 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
9 Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). See also Pound, 
Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 
640 (1916). 
10 Compare Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966), 
and KeIIey v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951), with 
Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). 
11 G.L., c. 123. 
12 Ex parte Dubois, 331 Mass. 575, 578, 120 N .E.2d 920, 922 (1954). 
IS G.L., c. 123, §§4, 28. 
14 Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 119, 136 A. 1112, 814 (1927). 
16 1$6 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818). 
16 Id. at 678. 
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doing another. That is, the chancellor denied the power of equity to 
prevent a personal wrong, and then prevented it, calling upon prece-
dent in the form of property rights to justify a departure from prece-
dent. "Something is found which gives the camel's nose legitimate 
standing in the chancellor's tent, and the whole beast follows .... "17 
After Gee v. Pritchard, there was a growing tendency in courts of 
equity to relieve personal wrongs. In 1946, a group of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses sought an injunction restraining officials of Chicopee, Massa-
chusetts, from arresting them for passing out pamphlets. The statute 
under which they were being arrested was clearly unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared itself "im-
pressed" by plaintiffs' suggestion that "if equity would safeguard 
their right to sell bananas it ought to be at least equally solicitous 
of their personal liberties guaranteed by the Constitution."18 The 
Court went on to say: "We believe the true rule to be that equity will 
protect personal rights by injunction upon the same conditions upon 
which it will protect property rights by injunction."19 These condi-
tions are if a substantial right of plaintiff will be materially impaired, 
if the legal remedy is inadequate, and if an injunction would be en-
forceable.20 
These conditions were met in Wiseman. The right in question is the 
right to privacy, which emanates from the Bill of Rights.21 This right 
is substantial, especially to people in the unfortunate situation of the 
inmates of Bridgewater. The mere fact of their confinement, if dis-
closed, might harm them; and in this case considerably more than 
that fact is disclosed. The abysmal conditions of their confinement are 
revealed in the film. Many are shown naked, in degrading and humil-
iating situations. A number of the men are clearly identifiable. A more 
material invasion of privacy could hardly be imagined. 
Damages awarded to the inmates by a court of law would not re-
pair the injury to one who was identified by people seeing the film. 
Every individual has a right "to be secured in his dignity and honor 
as part of his personality .... "22 The situations in which these inmates 
are pictured rob them of dignity and honor, and no amount of money 
will give it back. 
Of those who can be identified, perhaps not all would be so affected. 
They may have changed in appearance during their confinement and 
would be unrecognizable to former friends and neighbors. It is possi-
ble that they had no friends or have none now. They may have no 
17 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 
Harv. L. Rev. at 672. 
18 Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 820 Mass. at 588·584, 70 N.E.2d at 244. 
19 Id. at 584, 70 N .E.2d at 244. 
20 Ibid. 
21881 U.S. at 488·484. See also Pound, Interests of Personality (pts. 1·2), 28 Harv. 
L. Rev. 848, 445, 862·865, 447·458 (1915). 
22 Id. at 447. 
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family that would suffer if this film were shown. Still, the risks of 
showing the film readily should not be taken without sound justifica-
tion. 
To the inmates pictured who cannot be recognized, there may have 
been injury, but it is submitted that it is not irreparable. What injury 
there is lies mainly in the actual filming,28 which is not in issue. Even 
though there may be some injury to these people from the exhibition 
of the film - in that it might upset them if they saw or knew of the 
contents, which is unlikely during their confinement - they would not 
be injured in the eyes of society. This limited invasion of privacy is 
counterbalanced, in any event, by the interest of making the public 
aware of the situation. 
The enforceability of an injunction barring the exhibition of Tit-
icut Follies depends on the scope of the decree. The decree banning 
all showings of Titicut· Follies was easily enforceable. The Court for-
bade Wiseman to show the film to anyone, at any time, and to ensure 
that he did not, ordered him to tum over the negative and prints to 
the Commonwealth. This would not have been unusually difficult to 
enforce. 
The limited injunction granted by the Supreme Judicial Court, on 
the other hand, is more difficult to enforce. It limits showings to pro-
fessional audiences.24 It is not improbable that questions will arise as 
to how far the term professional extends; for instance, as to exactly 
what occupations are related to the fields specifically mentioned. Much 
time could be spent deciding these questions, with numerous fringe 
groups claiming the right to see it, and the Commonwealth contesting 
this right. The alternative would be for the Court, at the time of the 
first such decision, to spell out in minutest detail the qualities peculiar 
to a professional. This too would take time and would not necessarily 
eliminate any future problem of interpretation. 
In either case, the effect of the limited injunction could be irrational. 
It is possible to imagine a group of concerned, responsible adults, who, 
since they do not fall under any of the accepted headings, are denied 
access to the film. At the same time it may be readily available to their 
high school-age sons and daughters whose qualification is one hour a 
week spent in a course such as psychology or sociology.25 
In addition to matters of practicality, it should be noted that both 
these injunctions were in personam. They would affect Wiseman wher-
ever he went, whether to another state or to another country. There-
fore the decree of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts severely 
limits the exhibition of the movie everywhere in the world. It is sub-
mitted that the interest protected does not justify this wide a scope of 
28 Brief for Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae at 9. 
24 See note 2 supra. 
211 Milton High School, Milton, Massachusetts, offers such a course to students 
in the 12th grade. Telephone interview with secretary of the Guidance Depart-
ment of Milton High School, Oct. 27, 1969. 
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suppression, for the farther from Massachusetts one goes, the less is 
the likelihood of injury to the subjects of the film i~ the eyes of soci-
ety. 
The practical effect and the scope of the injunction granted raise 
the question of its propriety. The major consideration in answering 
this question is a constitutional one, i.e., whether the interest for 
which protection is sought is outweighed by the interest in freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
In cases where there may have been a violation of the First Amend-
ment, the courts normally decide that issue by applying the "balancing 
test."26 This test consists of weighing a governmental interest in sub-
duing expression against a private interest in allowing it. In this case, 
however, the interests on both sides are private. While the Common-
wealth is a party to the action, it is acting on behalf of private indi-
viduals. Actually, the Commonwealth's own interest would be better 
served if Titicut Follies were shown. It would arouse interest in the 
problems at such institutions, perhaps leading to widespread support 
of improvements. This was what state officials hoped for when the 
movie's filming was permitted. Now they are in the position of con-
testing the right of one individual, Wiseman, to disclose "what they 
feel would invade the privacy of other individuals, for whom they are 
responsible. 
A case in which similar rights were in conflict was Time, Inc. v. 
Hill.21 The Hills were held captive in their home by escaped convicts, 
who released them unharmed. After this incident the family moved 
and discouraged all publicity. Their experience, somewhat fictional-
ized, was incorporated into a book. That book was subsequently made 
into a pIa), which was reviewed in Life magazine. 
The review linked the Hills to the play, creating the impression that 
it was an accurate re-enactment of their experience. In the play the 
family suffered insult and violence which never actually occurred. Un-
der a New York privacy statute,28 Hill sued for damages for invasion 
of privacy. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a showing 
that the article was knowingly or recklessly false, it was protected by 
the First Amendment. . 
In Wiseman as in Hill, the individual's right to speak conflicts with 
the individual's right to privacy. The inmates at Bridgewater, like the 
Hill family, were thrust involuntarily into the arena of public interest. 
Once there, there is a limit to the protection they may receive. The re-
sultin Hill indicates that the Court decided this limit by using a bal-
ancing test similar to the one employed in cases where the government 
has an interest in suppressing speech. Harm to the individual, rather 
than harm to the government, is weighed against the value of allow-
ing the speech. 
28See 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.5, at 222·225. 
21885 U.S. 874 (1967). 
28 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§50·51 (McKinney 1948). 
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In both Hill and Wiseman the harm is apparent. The Coun in Hill 
noted that in privacy cases the primary damage' is mental distress. 
That is, injury to reputation bears on that damage.29 The Hills seem 
to have suffered considerable mental distress as a result of publication 
of the article in Life, even though it does not appear that their reputa-
'tion suffered greatly. It is uncertain, as mentioned above, to what de-
gree the showing of Titicut ,Follies would damage the reputations of 
or cause mental distress to inmates pictured in it. 
, Both the conflicting rights are constitutionally guaranteed.80 The 
right to freedom of speeech is explicit, while the right to privacy is 
implicit and its recognition is fairly recent. The Court in Hill men-
tioned the "primary value"81 which our society places on freedom of 
speech. Privacy is a very basic right also, one that is in increasing need 
of protection, as technological advances make invasions of it progres-
sively easier. Each case must be decided according to its particular cir-
cumstance.52 
The Court in Hill evidently reasoned that, although there may have 
been an invasion of privacy, the matter was one of public interest, the 
harm done was not too great, and so Life had a right to publish. It is 
recognized that in Wiseman there is an invasion of privacy much mOre 
basic than in Hill. But it is undisputed that the subject of the film -
conditions at a public institution for the mentally ill- is of consid-
erable public interest. If the invasion is more basic, the subject matter, 
it is submitted, is much more compelling. 
The pictures alleged to be invasions of privacy are directly related 
to the matter of concern. It was the conditions of living, care and 
treatment that needed to be improved; the film showed why. To point 
out the need for something, it is relevant to show the lack of it. 
It has been said that there is an excessive preoccupation with nudity 
and sensationalism in the film, in excess of what might have been nec-
essary for its effectiveness. Perhaps this is so. But it is not the coutt's 
function to decide whether or not there is. The Coun in Wiseman 
denied doing this,88 but it appears to have done so nonetheless. 
In finding that the book Tropic of Cancer was not obscene, the Su-
preme Judicial Court said: 
.•. It is not the function of judges to serve as arbiters of 
taste or to say that an author must regard vulgarity as unnecessary 
... to establish particular ideas. Within broad limits each writer, 
attempting to be a literary artist. is entitled to determi~e such 
29 Time, Inc. v. Hill, lI85 U.S. at lI84·lI85 n.9. 
80 Regarding freedom of s,peecb, see the First Amendment of the U.s. Constitu-
tion. Regarding the right to privacy, see the discussion of the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth and Ninth Amendments in Griswold v. Connecticut, lI81 U.S. 479, 48l1·485 
(1965). 
81 Time, Inc. v. Hill, lI85 U.S. at lI88. 
82 Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191. 2118 P.2d 670 (1951). 
88 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1064 n.l0, at 249 N.E.2d at 618. 
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matters for himself, even if the result is as dull, dreary, and of-
fensive as the writer of this opinion finds almost all of Tropic.34 
A movie is as much an art form as a book, and the film-maker should 
have the same license as an author. It should be left to the film-maker 
to decide what scenes are necessary to create an effective film. This film 
as a whole may stand or fall, according to whether or not it is deemed 
an unwarranted invasion of privacy; that is the issue before the court. 
The court may cite specific scenes which it feels are invasions in giving 
this decision, but it should not say whether those scenes are unneces-
sary. 
The Supreme Judicial Court conceded that the interest of some seg-
ments of the public in knowing of conditions at Bridgewater out-
weighs any possible harm to the inmates. On this basis the Court 
allows limited audiences to see the film. But this elitism is hardly a 
proper solution to the problem. If the film is shown to some segments 
of the public it should be shown to all segments. Everyone has the 
same right to know, regardless of the value of the knowledge to any 
particular individual. It is dangerous for the judicial system to decide 
what knowledge will be useful to whom, and to condition access to 
that knowledge on its decision. Such a practice raises a serious ques-
tion of denial of equal protection of the law.s5 
In conceding that the First Amendment guaranteed freedom of 
speech protects the showing of Titicut Follies to some of the public, 
the Court has in effect conceded that protection to its showing to the 
general public. A logical step for the United States Supreme Court-
if it grants certiorari in this case36 - would be to expand its holding 
in Time, Inc. v. Hill by bringing truthful disclosures in areas of pub-
lic concern under the protection of the First Amendment, even if such 
disclosures constitute a fundamental invasion of privacy, where the 
value of the disclosure seems to outweigh its harm. 
PATRICIA M. DINNEEN 
§lO.7. Right to a speedy trial: Presumption of waiver: Common-
wealth v. Marsh;l Needel v. Scafati.2 The history of the development 
of constitutional rights has consistently moved in the direction of 
granting greater protection to the accused, with the notable exception 
34 Attorney General v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 20, 
184 N.E.2d !J28, !I!J4 (1962). 
35 Cox v. Louisiana, !J79 U.s. 5!J6, 557·558 (1965). 
36 Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 249 N.E.2d 610, 
petition for cert. filed !J8 U.S.L.W. !JI02, No. 621 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1969) As of this 
date, no disposition has been made of the petition for certiorari. . 
§10.7. 1 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1229,242 N.E.2d 545. 
2289 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Mass. 1968). 
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of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a speedy trial.s For some in-
explicable reason, this right has always been tempered by the assump-
tion that it is automatically waived unless promptly claimed. Two 
cases decided in the 1969 SURVEY year afford examples of the pre-
sumption of waiver on the one hand, and the right to a speedy trial 
on the other. 
Commonwealth v. Marsh presents an extreme example of assumed 
waiver - the "demand" doctrine. In Marsh, the defendant was in-
dicted on October 1, 1965. On July 6, 1966, he moved for a speedy 
trial which was denied; on September 8, 1966, he moved for dismissal 
on the grounds that he was denied a speedy trial; on November 14, 
1966, he moved for dismissal on the same grounds; and on March 17, 
1967, he again moved for a speedy trial, " ... as provided by the Con-
stitution[s] of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts.'" Again, on October 25, 1967, the day of the trial, the defendant's 
attorney moved for dismissal on the grounds that the defendant had 
been denied a speedy trial. Apparently this was the first time the mo-
tion had come to the attention of the court, and accordingly, it was 
denied by the trial judge. In affirming the denial of this motion, the 
Supreme Judicial Court implicitly stated that the initial demand for 
a speedy trial and the subsequent follow-up motions were not suffi-
ciently strong to overcome the presumption of waiver. The Court 
HELD: In order to negative the presumption of waiver, the defen-
dant must make a demand that shows a desire for a prompt trial and 
he must make reasonable efforts to obtain one. In this case, the mo-
tions were not presented to the judge, and it was reasonable to view 
them as only preliminary steps in presenting the matter to the court.1I 
In furtherance of this position the Court stated: 
In our cases holding that the constitutional right has been 
denied, the issue of the effect of the mere filing of a motion has 
not arisen; in all the cases the defendants concerned were reason-
ably diligent in asserting their right to a speedy tria1.6 
In order to counter the defendant's somewhat reasonable contention 
that he was diligent in asserting his rights and that the lack of a hear-
ing was the district attorney's fault since he should have brought the 
motions before the court, the Supreme Judicial Court pointed to 
G.L., c. 278, §1, which allows the defendant to add cases to the trial 
list upon motion to the court.7 Regardless of the fact that this action 
is available to the defendant, it is somewhat unusual in that it ignores 
3 u.S. Const. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial .... " 
41968 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1230,242 N.E.2d at 547. 
II Id. at 1232, 242 N .E.2d at 548. 
6Id. at 1230-1231, 242 N.E.2d at 547. 
7 G.L., c. 278 §1, provides: "At each session of the superior court for criminal 
business, the district attorney, before trials begin, ~h,"l lll~e ~d deposit with 
23
O'Reilly: Chapter 10: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
228 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §10.7 
the basic fact that it is the duty of the district attorney, not the defen-
dant, to prosecute the case. Furthermore, it not only places the burden 
upon the defendant to make a demand for a speedy trial, but he must 
also see to it that something is done about his demand if he is to es-
cape the presumption of waiver. 
The contrasting view - that a speedy trial is a fundamental con-
stitutional right not presumed to be waived - is presented in Needel 
v. Scafati.8 In Needel, the defendant was indicted in Hampden County 
on January 4, 1960, while already in custody in Essex County on an 
unrelated charge for which he was later sentenced on February 10, 
1960. He was not officially informed of the Hampden County charges 
nor given copies of the indictments, and only learned of their exis-
tence informally. While serving the Essex County sentence, the Hamp-
den County authorities issued a bench warrant at Walpole Correctional 
Institution and then waited four and one half years until his release 
before arraigning the defendant. During this time the defendant 
attempted to learn the nature of the charges and to get copies of the 
indictments against him. On February 27, 1963, he finally managed 
to get the last of this information after some rather frustrating corre-
spondence with the Hampden County Clerk.9 This was the extent 
of the defendant's activity until November 1963 when, in accordance 
with G.L., c. 277, §72A, he was informed of his right to a prompt 
the clerk, for the inspection of parties, a list of all cases to be tried at that session, 
and the cases shall be tried In the order of such trial list, unless otherwise ordered 
by the court for cause shown. Cases may be added to such list by direction of the 
court, upon motion of the district attorney or of the defendant." 
8 This case was recently overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Needel 
v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 88 U.S.L.W. 8180 (U.S. Oct. 
14, 1969) primarily on the grounds that the defendant had not exhausted his state 
remedies since the district court, in holding that there was no waiver, used ev· 
idence which the defendant, for some unfathomable reason, had not presented 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. Consequently, the circuit court did not feel that 
it could find the Supreme Judicial Court wrong as to the matter of waiver, on 
the basis of the evidence that the Supreme Judicial Court had before it. 
The circuit court does say, however, in support of the district court's finding: 
"We are reluctant to prolong petitioner's pursuit and to nullify the careful efforts 
of the district court. But if the state and federal judicial systems are to work in 
complementary harmony, the state courts must be. given a fair chance to assess 
constitutional issues. While federal courts should not abstain from decision simply 
because of the appearance of additional bits of evidence, inevitable in a new 
hearing, we find here that the underlying thrust of the issues posed and the 
evidence adduced presented petitioner's case in a significantly different posture 
from that considered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Under these 
circumstances, we decide that the judgment below should be reversed and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the petition." 412 F.2d at 766. 
9 On March 12, 1960, defendant wrote the clerk requesting the docket numbers 
and the nature of the charges in the outstanding indictments. The clerk replied 
only that one indictment was outstanding. On Mar. 16, 1961, defendant again 
inquired also asking the date of the next criminal session. The clerk replied with 
information as to the indictments only and the date of the next criminal session. 
On Oct. 16, 1961, defendant requested copies of the indictments and the clerk 
sent only one. On Feb. 20, 1968, defendant again wrote the clerk, requesting a 
copy of the other indictment which he finally received on Feb. 27, 1968. 
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tria1.10 He was not notified in writing, however, nor was he advised 
of the precedures to follow in order to assert this right. 
The case worked its way through the lower state courts, and on the 
basis of the defendant's above described activities, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court affirmed the finding that he had waived his rights to a 
speedy trial by never formally requesting one.11 When he turned to 
the federal system in seeking a writ of habeas corpus, however, the 
Federal District Court for Massachusetts in granting the writ, felt that 
the defendant did not know of his right to a speedy trial until long 
after his indictment and that even then he was unaware of the correct 
procedure to follow in order to obtain one . 
. . . Until November 1963 (46 months after indictment) peti-
tioner did not know that he had the right to a speedy trial. Since 
he did not know of the existence of the right he could not intelli-
gently or understandingly or intentionally relinquish or abandon 
it .... His failure to request or demand trial after he was made 
aware of his right to a speedy trial, is not a sufficient basis for an 
inference that he had waived it.12 
The district court in Needel, in effect, bases its decision on the con-
cept that a speedy trial is a constitutional right which should not be 
arbitrarily denied under an assumption of waiver. "There is a pre-
sumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. For a waiver 
to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."ls 
The Marsh case, on the other hand, is decided on exactly the oppo-
site criteria, as is shown by the opinion's endorsement of the language 
in Commonwealth v. Hanley.l4 
... We think t.!at the full intent of the constitutional protec-
tion will be afforded by a rule that in the absence of a showing 
of circumstances which negative the implication, the failure to 
demand prompt trial implies a waiver of the right thereto.11i 
10 C.L., c. 277, §72A, provides in part: "The commissioner of correction . 
shall, upon learning that an untried indictment . • . is pending in any court in 
the commonwealth against any prisoner serving a term of imprisonment in any 
correctional institution, . . . notify such prisoner in writing thereof, stating its 
contents, including the court in which it is pending, and that such prisoner has 
the right to apply, as hereinafter provided, to such court for prompt trial or other 
disposition thereof. 
"Such application shall be in writing and given or sent . • . to the commis-
sioner of correction ... who shall promptly forward it to such court. . .. 
"Any such prisoner shall, within six months after such application is received 
by the court, be brought into court for trial or other disposition of any such 
indictment •.. unless the court shall otherwise order." 
11 Commonwealth v. Needel, 349 Mass. 580, 211 N.E.2d 335 (1965). 
12 289 F. Supp. at 1013. 
13 Ibid. 
14 337 Mass. 384, 149 N.E.2d 608 (1958). 
111 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1230, 242 N.E.2d at 547. 
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In view of the obvious conflict between these doctrines, it seems 
advisable to trace their development, starting with the right to a 
speedy trial. This concept, along with most of our common law, was 
brought over from England where it had been embodied in the 
Magna Charta.16 The concept was thought to be so important that 
it was incorporated into the Constitution as the Sixth Amendment. 
Subsequently its sanctity declined until it seemed to have reached a 
point wherein it was regarded as merely an empty phrase carrying 
little or no actual value. Even in recent history, where the trend has 
been to extend more and more of the sanctions of procedural due 
process to one accused of a crimep the right to a speedy trial has 
received a minimum of attention until most recently. 
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to 
a speedy trial was Beavers v. Haubert,18 in which it was found that 
the right is not absolute, but that it is "consistent with delays and 
depends upon circumstances."19 In Pollard v. United States,20 the 
circumstances supporting petitioner's right to a speedy trial were said 
to be "purposeful and oppressive delays"21 by the state, and though 
this phrase tends to define the limits to which the state can go, it also 
serves to give the state great leeway within those limits. In 1966 Jus-
tice White reaffirmed these views, although the opinion also contains 
a good explanation of the reasons behind the speedy trial concept. 
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue 
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety 
and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the 
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused 
to defend him~l£. However, in large measure because of the 
many procedural safeguards provided an accused, the ordinary 
procedures for criminal prosecution are desi~ led to move at a 
deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed would 
have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and 
upon the ability of society to protect itsel£.22 
The unfortunate part of this "deliberate pace" concept is that in this 
case there was more than a two-year delay before the trial.28 
In the process of carving out the exceptions to the right to a speedy 
trial, the courts have isolated four relevant factors, anyone of which 
16 Magna Charta, 9 Hen. lI, c. 29 [c. 40 of King John's Charter of 1215] (1225). 
17 Miranda v. Arizona, lIB4 U.S. 4117 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois. 1I78 U.S. 478 
(1964); Massiah v. United States, 1I77 U.S. 201 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 
U.S. 1I115 (19611); Rochin v. California, !l42 U.S. 165 (1952). 
18 198 U.S. 77 (1905). 
19Id. at 87. 
20 1I52 U.s. 1I54 (1957). 
21 Id. at 1I61. 
22 United States v. Ewell. lIBlI U.s. 116, 120 (1966). 
28 The defendants had been convicted, and after serving for two years their 
sentence was vacated because of a defect in the indictment. whereupon they were 
immediately rearrested and reindicted for the same offense. 
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is usually sufficient to defeat the claim. "Four factors are generally 
held to be relevant in considering a claim of denial of a speedy trial: 
the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the 
defendant, and waiver by the defendant."24 
Considering first the length of the delay, the courts have generally 
held that 
[M]ere lapse of time is not enough to establish denial of a 
speedy trial. There [Fleming v. United States]211 we observed that 
a delay of eleven months was "very short" and hence not unreason-
able. It is essential that defendant also show prejudice or that 
the delay was improperly motivated.26 
A few courts, on the other hand, consider the length of delay alone, 
if sufficiently long, to be enough to support a claim of the denial of 
a speedy trial. "Although what amounts to an undue delay is 'not 
fixed by the statute in days or months,' depending as it does 'upon 
the circumstances of each particular case' . . . it may not seriously 
be urged that the six-year lag in the present case was consistent with 
the mandate for a speedy trial."27 And also, "Two years have now 
elapsed. This plainly is more than a reasonable time."28 
Touching briefly on the reasons for the delay, traditionally the 
courts have held that almost any excuse by the state will justify the 
delay. These have included: delays so that an undercover agent would 
not have to reveal his identity,29 delays enabling further investiga-
tion,30 and delays in order to locate the prosecution's missing wit-
ness.S1 
Mere expense, however, has been held not to be a valid reason to 
delay a trial. In Commonwealth v. McGrath,32 the district attorney 
declined to pay defendant's round trip travel expenses from the fed-
eral prison in Atlanta, Georgia, to the trial in Suffolk County, where-
upon the court held, 
... that the right to a speedy trial contemplates that the Com-
monwealth will take reasonable action to prevent undue delay 
in bringing a defendant to trial, even though some expenses may 
be involved in bringing him into the Commonwealth and re-
turning him to Federal custody. The Commonwealth must, within 
24 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 353 Mass. 429, 431, 233 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1967). 
211378 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1967). - ED. 
26 Carroll v. United States, 392 F.2d 185, 186 (1st Cir. 1968); accord, United 
States v. Beard, 381 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1967). 
27 People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 357, 130 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1955). 
28 Bishop v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 258, 260, 225 N.E.2d 345, 346 (1967). 
29 Fleming v. United States, 378 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1967); United States v. Sim-
mons, 338 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 983 (1965). 
30 United States v. Lester, 328 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Brown, 
188 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
31 United States v. Kaufman, 311 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963). 
32348 Mass. 748, 205 N.E.2d 710 (1965). 
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a reasonable time, either secure the defendant's presence for trial 
or dismiss the indictments.ss 
In Smith v. Hooey,S4 the Supreme Court reiterates this concept, thus 
extending it to the federal courts. 
The determination of whether or not the defendant has been prej-
udiced by the delay is closely entwined with the length and the rea-
son for the delay, although some courts do attempt to separate it and 
treat it independently. As such, the question that arises is whether 
the delay alone, assuming it to be reasonably long, entitles the defen-
dant to a dismissal or whether he must show that he has been prej-
udiced by the delay. The traditional view, that he must show prejudice, 
is succinctly put in Fleming v. United States: "Whether there is any 
merit in this claim ... depends upon whether this defendant was 
prejudiced by this delay or whether it was occasioned by oppressive 
or culpable governmental conduct."sli A few courts, on the other 
hand, feel that prejudice need not be shown. 
The Government argues that appellant has not made a con-
vincing demonstration that the delay prejudiced him in the 
presentation of his case and, although we agree, we think that a 
showing of prejudice is not required when a criminal defendant 
is asserting a constitutional right under ~he Sixth Amendment.36 
By far the most controversial factor though, is in the area of waiver, 
permeated as it is by the demand doctrine. This doctrine, although 
possibly developed somewhat earlier, is well articulated in Shepherd 
v. United States: 
[T]he right of the accused to a discharge for failure of the pros-
ecution to give him a speedy trial is a personal one to him and 
may be waived. He must assert the right if he wishes its protec-
tion and if he does not make a demand for trial or resist a con-
tinuance of the case, or if he goes to trial without objection that 
the time limit has passed, or fails to make some kind of effort to 
secure a speedy trial, he will not ordinarily be in position to de-
mand dismissal because of delay in prosecution .... 37 
This "demand" doctrine has been supported and followed in the 
federal courts, and in each decision, the original right to a speedy 
trial seems to have slightly altered and lessened in one way or another. 
83 Id. at 752, 205 N.E.2d at 714. 
84393 U.S. 374 (1969). 
811 378 F.2d 502, 504 (1st Cir. 1967); accord, "A defendant certainly has not suf-
fered the denial of a speedy trial unless he has been prejudiced by the delay 
in his trial." United States v. Richardson, 291 F. Supp. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 
United States v. Curry, 278 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Gladding, 
265 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
86 United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477·478 (2d Cir. 1968). 
87163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947). 
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For example, James v. United States38 reiterates and expands upon 
the idea that the defendant loses the right if he himself has caused 
the delay. In this case, the finding of waiver was probably justified 
since the defendant twice asked for new counsel and for continuation 
of the trial. 
In an opinion by Judge Burger, the same court later asserted: "Gen-
erally a speedy trial claim is waived unless the right is asserted 
promptly,"39 thereby firmly establishing the need for a seasonable 
claim of delay.40 
In Von Feldt v. United States,41 the court ruled, "Pertinent to the 
question of the diligence required of the defendant, the courts have 
ruled with consistency that where, as here, the defendants are at lib-
erty on bond and are represented by counsel, a demand for a speedy 
trial should be made by the defendants and that failure to make such 
a demand will constitute a waiver."42 Earlier, in United States v. 
Sanchez,43 the defendant was held required to make a prompt asser-
tion for a speedy trial or of prejudice claimed as a result of delay, 
despite the fact that he was without the assistance of counsel during 
the pre-arrest delay. 
Basically then, it seems fairly well established that until very re-
cently the federal courts believed the demand doctrine to be good 
law and binding precedent. This was dramatically shown in United 
States v. Lustman,44 where the court, after commenting favorably 
upon reasoning contra the demand doctrine, said: "The federal de-
cisions, however, clearly establish that the right to a speedy trial is 
the defendant's personal right and is deemed waived if not promptly 
asserted. "45 
This necessity of the 4emand for a speedy trial has been the rule 
in a great majority of the states as well,46 and Massachusetts is no 
exception. At least as early as 1958 in Commonwealth v. Hanley,47 
the Supreme Judicial Court found that the defendant had waived 
his right to a speedy trial despite the fact that there had been a delay 
of almost three years and that the defendant claimed to have written 
to the derk asking for trial. In establishing the demand doctrine, 
the Court first found that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights48 
88261 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 930 (1959). 
89 Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312, 314 n.I (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
40 Accord, 392 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1968); 378 F .2d 502 (1st Cir. 1967). 
41407 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1969). 
42Id. at 98. 
43 361 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1966). 
44 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958). 
45 United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1958). 
46 Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302 (1958). 
47337 Mass. 384, 149 N.E.2d 608 (1958). 
48 Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. 11. "Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find 
a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which 
he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right 
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gives the defendant in a criminal case the right to a speedy trial. It 
then states that: "The right is a personal one and may be waived";49 
and, in further elucidation of this doctrine, it states, "We think that 
the full intent of the constitutional protection will be afforded by a 
rule that in the absence of a showing of circumstances which negative 
the implication, the failure to demand a prompt trial implies a waiver 
of the right thereto."110 
All of these cases discussed heretofore, however, seem to belie, or 
at least to ignore, the fact that constitutional guarantees, which in-
clude the right to a speedy trial, are fundamental rights. In Brookhart 
v. Janis/a in reference to the Sixth Amendment right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses, Justice Black stated: 
... The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed con-
stitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled by 
federal law. There is a presumption against the waiver of con-
stitutional rights, ... and for a waiver to be effective it must be 
clearly established that there was "an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."52 
Although these cases do not apply precisely to the speedy trial 
clause of the Sixth Amendment, they would seem to incorporate it 
into their reasoning. Nevertheless it was not until Klopfer v. North 
Carolina53 in 1967 that this was stated in so many words. In Klopfer, 
the petitioner's case had been postponed for two terms after an initial 
mistrial, and he finally filed a petition with the court to determine 
when he would be tried. The state declined to prosecute and instead 
filed a nolle prosequi with leave,54 to which petitioner objected, claim-
and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and 
without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws." 
49 337 Mass. 384, 387, 149 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1958). 
110 Id. at 388, 149 N.E.2d at 611. 
111384 U.s. I (1966). 
52Id. at 4. The Court has held that the defendant, even though an attorney him-
self, did not waive the assistance of counsel, stating: "To preserve the protection 
of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed defendants, we indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights." Glasser v. United States, 
315 U.S. 50, 70 (1942). The Court also stated: "The right to have the assistance 
of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice 
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its deniaI." Id. at 76. 
In 1938 the Court had already stated the need for a con,scious and deliberate 
waiver. "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938), accord, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). 
53 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
54 This is a process peculiar to North Carolina whereby the accused is dis-
charged from custody but remains liable for prosecution at any future time, sub-ject only to the discretion of the prosecutor. 
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ing the right to a speedy trial. When the case reached the Supreme 
Court, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, stated that: 
By indefinitely prolonging this oppression, as well as the 'anx-
iety and concern accompanying public accusation', the criminal 
procedure condoned in this case by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina clearly denies the petitioner the right to a speedy trial 
which we hold is guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States. [Footnote omitted.]55 
He further states, more importantly, "We hold here that the right to 
a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the 
Sixth Amendment."Ci6 
These cases taken together would seem to establish that, henceforth 
at least, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is a fundamental 
right, applicable to the state as well as the federal courts, and that 
there is a strong presumption against the waiver of this fundamental 
right. A few cases, in fact, have held accordingly. One of the best 
reasoned of these was People v. Prosser,CiT decided 12 years before 
Klopfer. 
Under such decisions [those requiring a demand for a speedy 
trial], the burden of obtaining a prompt trial is on the defendant; 
the state, having procured an indictment, is not compelled to do 
anything until the defendant demands a trial, and even then, 
if the demand is not made promptly, it may claim that he has 
waived his right to a speedy trial. Years may have elapsed, so 
that the time between indictment and trial exceeds even that 
permitted by the applicable statute of limitations between com-
mission of the crime and indictment, and yet, these cases hold, 
the prosecution remains free to press the charge and proceed to 
trial. ... 
The second view [that waiver is not assumed] is the one we find 
sounder and more persuasive. It is the state which initiates the 
action and it is the state which must see that the defendant is 
arraigned. It is likewise the state which has the duty of seeing 
that the defendant is speedily brought to trial. And from this 
it follows that the mere failure of the defendant to take affirma-
tive action to prevent delay may not, without more, be construed 
or treated as a waiver. [Footnote omitted.]Ci8 
In United States v. Lustman, also decided before the Supreme 
Court decision in the Klopfer case, the court spends some time on 
this conflict, and though it seems to favor the nonwaiver doctrine, 
IiCi Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967). 
Ci6 Id. at 223. 
CiT 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955). 
1i8Id. at 358, 130 N.E.2d at 894·895. 
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citing the Prosser case with approval, it finds that, at the time, the 
demand rule was still settled doctrine in the federal courts. 
More recently, in United States v. Richardson,59 the court again 
discusses these conflicting doctrines and tries to reconcile them, noting 
that many of the cases following the demand rule have placed em-
phasis upon the fact that the defendant was represented by counsel. 
However, in at least one of the cases asserting the nonwaivability of 
a fundamental right, the defendant was himself a lawyer, and was 
represented by a lawyer.6o Consequently, this attempt at reconcilia-
tion seems somewhat weak and doomed to failure, the two doctrines 
remaining at opposite poles. 
Finally, in Massachusetts, returning to the Needel case, the district 
court was found accepting and endorsing the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, only to be overturned by the 
circuit court on a procedural point. The circuit court did, however, 
seem to be in sympathy with the district court insofar as the basic 
question of waiver went. 
Currently, most of the federal courts still seem to adhere to the 
demand rule, as do a majority of the states.61 However, it must be 
assumed that the force of Klopfer has not yet had much opportunity 
to be called upon, and that it will, in the future, more firmly establish 
the concept that a speedy trial is as much of a fundamental right as 
is the right to counsel. This conclusion would seem valid for a number 
of reasons. First, and probably most important, is that Klopfer estab-
lishes the right to a speedy trial as a fundamental constitutional right, 
and as such, it is just as applicable to the states - either directly 
through the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, or through the due 
process route of the Fourteenth Amendment - as it is to the federal 
courts. Consequently, it must not be presumed to be waived arbitrar-
ily. It might be added that the right to a speedy trial is also found 
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,62 offering another pos-
sible route. 
Another factor which should tend to hasten the decline of the de-
mand doctrine is the fact that nearly every state constitution has 
59291 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
60 1114 U.s. 60 (1942). 
61 Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1102 (1958). The count presently stands at 411 to 7, with 
the states not supporting the demand rule being: Arizona, State v. Maldonado, 92 
Ariz. 70, 11711 P.2d 5811 (1962); Colorado, Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 26, 1164 P.2d 
877 (1961); Indiana, Zehrlent v. State, 2110 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 2011 (1951); Kansas, 
State v. Hess, 180 Kan. 472, 11M P.2d 877 (1956); New York; People v. Prosser, 1109 
N.Y. 11511, 1110' N.E.2d 891 (1955); Oklahoma, Davidson v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 
402, 171 P.2d 640 (1946); and Oregon, State v. Dodson, 226 Ore. 458, 1160 P.2d 
782 (1961). 
62 "If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in 
filing any information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the 
district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, 
the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint. Fed. R. Crim. 
P.48(b). 
32
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/13
§IO.7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 237 
some provision for a speedy trial,63 and most of these even provide 
for some form of compensation if the defendant is denied this right.64 
Another very basic reason for the rejection of the demand doctrine 
is the fact that, besides flying in the face of constitutional rights, it 
is based upon essentially fallacious reasoning. Discounting the argu-
ments of crowded dockets and convenience to the state, both of which 
would probably be justifiable reasons for some delay, the demand 
doctrine is based on the rather strange assumption that any delay is 
more advantageous to the accused than to the prosecution. This as-
sumption seems to ignore reality since the prosecution is much better 
able to keep track of facts and witnesses than is the accused. Further-
more, the demand doctrine assumes that the silence of the accused 
is a deliberate waiver whereas it could just as easily stem from igno-
rance of the need to demand a speedy trial, or even from ignorance 
of the indictment. To quote again from the decision in Prosser: 
As for the asserted danger that a defendant may sit back and, 
if the prosecution fails for one reason or another to move the 
indictment for a trial expeditiously, claim his right to a speedy 
trial and go free, it is somewhat less than real. Overlooked is 
the fact that the district attorney may at any time have the case 
placed on the calender for a particular day.611 
Finally, there is the fact that the state, and not the defense, has 
an affirmative duty in prosecuting the case quickly. 
. . . The government and, for that matter, the trial court are 
not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal 
cases. T~e burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the 
defense. The right to "a speedy ... trial" is constitutionally guar-
anteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant 
and the knowledgeable. The United States Attorney has a duty 
to press criminal cases to trial, to give them any necessary priority, 
and to prevent, whenever possible, even the suggestion of stale-
ness.66 
Consequently, despite the apparent reluctance of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, and, to a lesser degree, the First Circuit Court, to 
accept the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, it seems that the 
demand doctrine should become less and less viable, at least as regards 
silence being considered a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. The 
other three factors -length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice 
resulting from the delay - will continue to serve in considering 
63 See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. I, art. 11. 
64 See, e.g., G.L., c. Z17, §73, which provides for compensation equivalent to lost 
earnings for any confinement beyond six months if the defendant is later dis-
charged without trial, or is finally acqUitted. See also Note, The Lagging Right 
to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1587 (1965). 
65 People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 361, 130 N.E.2d 891, 896 (1955). 
66 Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1969). 
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whether an accused has been denied a speedy trial, as will waiver, 
but only if the right is actively waived. No longer should the mere 
failure to demand his fundamental constitutional rights deny those 
rights to an accused. 
H. SAGE WALCOTT 
§IO.8. Freedom of association: Knowingly being in the company of 
one illegally possessing a narcotic drug: Commonwealth v. Tirella.1 
On November 25, 1967, a Boston police officer observed one Juan 
Perez approach an automobile containing three individuals. The 
driver of the automobile passed money to Perez and in return received 
from him several glassine bags. The defendant, John Tirella, a 
passenger in the back seat observed the entire transaction. Later, a 
second police officer stopped the automobile and upon investigation 
found that the glassine bags contained heroin. 
The defendant was convicted under the second clause of G.L., c. 94, 
§213A, which reads 
Whoever is present where a narcotic drug is illegally kept or 
deposited, or whoever is in the company of a person, knowing 
that said person is illegally in possession of a narcotic drug, or 
whoever conspires with another person to violate the narcotic 
drugs law, may be arrested without a warrant by an officer or 
inspector whose duty it is to enforce the narcotic drugs law, and 
may be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not 
more than five years, or by imprisonment in a jailor house of 
correction for not more than two years or by a fine of not less than 
five hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.2 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued 
that the second clause violated his constitutional rights in that it was 
vague and indefinite, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and 
interfered with the right of association.8 The Supreme Judicial Court 
sustained the statute and HELD: The statute was a reasonable effort 
to suppress narcotics, and was indeed constitutional. The Court said 
that "in the company of" is specific enough so that men of common 
intelligence could comprehend its meaning. It means associating in 
a way that "smacks of ... companionship, friendly intercourse, and 
the like."· As to the argument that punishment of the defendant is 
cruel and unusual, the Court summarily dismissed it by saying that 
the holding in Commonwealth v. Buckley,r, that the first clause of 
§213A does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, is also appli-
cable to the second clause.6 As for the statute establishing guilt by 
§10.8. 1 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1075, 249 N.E.2d 573. 
2 C.L., c. 94, §213A. 
8 Commonwealth v. Tirella, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1076, 249 N.E.2d at 574. 
4Id. at 1077, 249 N.E.2d at 575. 
11354 Mass. 508, 238 N.E.2d 335 (1968). 
6 Commonwealth v. Tirella, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1078, 249 N.E.2d at 576. 
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association, the Court said that the statute only made the association 
an offense and in no way set up a presumption of guilt.7 
It is submitted that these constitutional arguments were unconvinc-
ingly brief and therefore deserving of review. In Commonwealth v. 
Slome,8 the Supreme Judicial Court set forth some guidelines con-
cerning the determination of whether a statute is vague and indefinite. 
For purposes of determining vagueness of a statute, tl:\e words must 
be given their usual and ordinary meaning. It then must be deter-
mined whether the statute, so construed, would allow an ordinary 
member of society to understand what is prohibited.9 In the present 
case, the Supreme Judicial Court came to the conclusion that the 
words "in the company of" implied fellowship or friendly intercourse 
and were sufficiently definitive so as to provide a member of society 
with the knowledge of what is prohibited.10 
It is submitted that the words "in the company of" do not allow 
the ordinary member of society to know what is prohibited. In Alegata 
v. Commonwealth (the Mitchell case),H the Court analyzed the stat-
utory wording which empowered the police to arrest and prosecute suspi-
cious persons abroad in the nighttime who could not give a "satisfactory 
account of themselves."12 The Court held that the word "satisfactory" 
was imprecise and no guidance was supplied by the legislature to 
explain away this vagueness. "This leaves too much discretion in the 
hands of the police and the courts."13 In the same manner, the leg-
islature provided no guidance as to the construction of the equally 
imprecise words, "in the company of."14 In the present case the courts 
and police are given too much power as to the interpretation and 
construction of that phrase. Even using the Court's interpretation, 
an average person would be hard put to know at what point his re-
lations with a possessor of narcotics made his association criminal. 
Therein lies the imprecision. Imagine an average man meeting his 
neighbor, who commonly possesses marihuana. It would be impossible 
for that average man to determine whether a friendly greeting, an 
extended discussion about the weather, or a more intimate discussion 
was a violation of Section 213A. The Supreme Judicial Court prop-
erly noted the injustices involved in maintaining a constitutionally 
vague statute: 
... A citizen is entitled to protection from prosecution unless 
the statute on its face penalizes the particular conduct with which 
7Id. at 1078. 249 N.E.2d at 576. 
8821 Mass. 718. 75 N.E.2d 517 (1947). 
9Id. at 716. 75 N.E.2d at 519. Similar standards are set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Winters v. New York. 888 U.S. 507 (1948). 
10 Commonwealth v. Tirella. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1076. 249 N.E.2d at 574. 
11 858 Mass. 287. 289. 281 N.E.2d 201. 202 (1967). 
12Id. at 289. 281 N.E.2d at 202. 
13Id. at 298. 281 N.E.2d at 205. 
14 Commonwealth v. Tirella. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1077 0.2. 249 N.E.2d at 
5750.2. 
35
O'Reilly: Chapter 10: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
240 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §10.8 
he is charged. One ought not to be compelled to speculate at his 
peril as to whether a statute permits or prohibits any action which 
he proposes to take. If the standard of guilt prescribed by a stat-
ute is so variable, vague or uncertain that it is useless as a measure 
of criminal liability, then the statute must be struck down.lll 
The defendant, Tirella, also argued that the statute imposed a cruel 
and unusual punishment.16 The Court in its opinion said: "The holding 
... in the Buckley case ... that the first clause of §213A does not ... 
impose a cruel and unusual punishment [is] equally applicable to the 
second clause."17 In Buckley, the Court dismissed the argument of 
cruel and unusual punishment by saying: "No such violation of con-
stitutional interests can reasonably be found in view of the require-
ment in the first clause of §213A, as interpreted by us, that there be 
proof of knowledge of facts constituting noncompliance with the stat-
ute."18 It is difficult to imagine how this rationale relates to the con-
stitutional question of severity of the sentence. 
In Trop v. Dulles,19 the United States Supreme Court set forth an 
explanation of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment." It is ev-
ident from these standards that the Supreme Court's decision on any 
specific case depends greatly upon the sensitivities of the individual 
justices. 
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing 
less than the dignity of man. While the state has the power to 
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be ex-
ercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprison-
ment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the 
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of 
these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect .... The 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.20 
It is impossible to predict whether Tirella's punishment would be de-
clared cruel and unusual if the Supreme Court were to review the 
present case. Yet, it can be argued that a statute which attempts to 
deter the narcotics offender by punishing his friends, by its very na-
ture, is suspect of being primitive and does not meet the "evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 
Even thousands of years ago the Bible broke away from ancient Near 
East law which commonly inflicted a penalty on a person other than 
the actual culprit.1I1 
111 Commonwealth v. Slome, 821.Mass. at 715. 75 N.E.2d at 519. 
16 Commonwealth v. Tirella, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1076, 249 N.E.2d at 574. 
17Id. at 1078, 249 N.E.2d at 576. 
18 Commonwealth v. Buckley, 854 Mass. 508, 518, 288 N.E.2d 885, 888-889. 
19856 U.s. 86 (1958). 
20 Id.at 100-101. 
21 Y. Kaufmann, Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion 5-28 (M. Haran ed. 1960). 
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This principle of individual culpability in fact governs all of 
the biblical law. Nowhere does the criminal law of the Bible, in 
contrast to that of the rest of the Near East, punish secular of-
fenses collectively or vicariously. Murder, negligent homicide, se-
duction, and so forth, are punished solely on the person of the 
actual culprit.22 
In Weems v. United States,28 the United States Supreme Court was 
faced with a defendant sentenced to 15 years hard labor for falsifying 
a public record. Justice McKenna said that justice could only be pre-
served by making the punishment proportionate to the offense. He 
also pointed out that crimes which were worse than the defendant's 
crime were not punished so severely.24 Unfortunately, state appellate 
courts have been reluctant to judge their statutes on the basis of se-
verity of the punishment.21S However, using those standards applied 
by the Supreme Court, Section 213A appears to punishl defendants 
disproportionately to the offense. Since the statute is rather unique 
and the offense does not resemble any common law crime, there is no 
traditional means by which a court may compare the punishment to 
the offense. Therefore, the lack of any comparable common law crime 
probably indicates the insignificant nature of the offense. Considering 
the unorthodox and insignificant nature of the offense, one is hard put 
to believe that a sentence of 18 months for a violation of the statute 
in question is anything but cruel and unusual punishment. 
It is well accepted that where a state law defines a personal associa-
tion as illegal, the law may be susceptible to attack as an infringement 
of the First Amendment constitutional "right of association."26 The 
test for determining whether "the right of association" has been tam-
pered with is a consideration of the balance between the constitutional 
right and the state's interest in regulating it.21 For example, in NAACP 
v. Alabama,28 the Court said that Alabama's need for NAACP member-
ship lists did not justify a constitutional infringement upon that group. 
On the other hand, in Communist Party of the United States v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd.,29 the Court did not allow the Commu-
nist Party to withho~d its membership lists. The Court reasoned: 
... Where the mask of anonymity which an organization's mem-
bers wear serves the double purpose of protecting them from 
popular prejudice and of enabling them to cover over a foreign-
directed conspiracy, infiltrate into other groups, and enlist the 
22Id. at 23. 
28217 u.S. 349 (1910). 
24 Id. at 357-367. 
211 D. Fellman, The Defendant's Rights 206 (1958). 
26Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale L.J. I, 
20 (1964). 
21Id. at 7. 
28357 u.s. 449 (1958) • 
• 367 U.s. 1 (1961). 
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support of persons who would not, if the truth were revealed, 
lend their support, . . . it would be a distortion of the First 
Amendment to hold that it prohibits Congress from removing the 
mask.80 
Therefore, in applying the aforementioned test to the case in question, 
one must ask whether Section 213A is in the public interest and if that 
interest justifies interference with a First Amendment constitutional 
right. 
The Supreme Judicial Court argued that Section 213A does not vi-
olate the right of association because "the Legislature may lawfully 
proscribe any substantial association with one illegally in possession 
of narcotics as a method of discouraging that serious evil and achiev-
ing social rejection of the illegal possessor, thus depriving him of any 
encouragement which may be given acquiescent companionship."81 It 
is doubtful! whether Section 213A actually achieves social rejection 
and a deterrent effect. Logic dictates that drug users and drug ped-
dlers have displayed, by their very acts, antisocial characteristics. It is 
entirely possible that ostracism could increase those antisocial feelings 
and further harden the drug offender. In other words, the statute 
could have an effect opposite to that suggested by the Court in its 
opinion. One cannot help but believe that the words of Dr. Karl Men-
ninger, eminent psychiatrist, apply to the statute in question: "[t]he 
deterrence theory is used widely as a cloak for vengeance."32 
The complexity of the deterrence theory, at the very least, deserves 
a more careful approach than was evidenced by the legislature and the 
Court. Professor Johannes Andenaes of Oslo, Norway, in a speech to.a 
group of criminologists at the University of Toronto, warned that the 
theory of deterrence is highly complex, and that the prime danger is 
that of generalization.88 Dr. Richard L. Solomon, editor of the Psycho-
logical Review, has further demonstrated the complexity of deterrence 
by listing the factors which determine the effectiveness of punishment 
as a deterrent: 
(a) intensity of the punishment stimulus, (b) whether the re-
sponse being punished is an instrumental one or a consummatory 
pne, (c) whether the response is instinctive or reflexive, (d) whether 
it was established originally by reward or by punishment, (e) 
whether or not the punishment is closely associated in time with 
the punished response, (f) the temporal arrangements of reward 
and punishment, (g) the strength of the response to be punished, 
(h) the familiarity of the subject with the punishment being used, 
(i) whether or not a reward alternative is offered during the be-
havior-suppression period induced by punishment, (j) whether a 
80Id. at 102· lOll. 
81 Commonwealth v. Tirella, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1078, 249 N.E.2d at 576. 
82 K. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 206 (1968). 
88 Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime? 11 Crim. L.Q. 76, 80 (1968). 
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distinctive, incompatible avoidance response is strengthened by 
omission of punishment, (k) the age of the subject, and (1) the 
strain and species of the subject.84 
When the complexity of the deterrence doctrine is thus considered, 
the Court's assumption that the drug possessor will be discouraged by 
social rejection is unconvincing. There is no question that it is within 
the state's interest to enact effective drug legislation. However, the de-
gree of protection provided by Section 213A has not sufficiently been 
shown so as to justify interference with a major constitutional right. 
The Supreme Judicial Court is justified in its concern over the se-
riousness of the Massachusetts narcotics problem. FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover, in his 1968 annual report stated that the northeast sur-
passed all national geographic areas in the number of heroin, cocaine 
and marihuana arrests.all The Court's concern, however, does not war-
rant the upholding of G.L., c. 94, §213A, on constitutional grounds. 
There are numerous means available to control the drug problem 
without resorting to laws that infringe upon basic constitutional 
rights. 
Drug education is one means by which the tide of drug addiction 
and traffic may be stemmed. If the drug peddler is faced with an in-
formed community, the degree of profitability may wane and put an 
end to his enterprise. An advisory committee in the State Department 
of Education is presently working on courses on drugs and narcotics 
for kindergarten through the 12th grade.a6 This project is long over-
due when one considers that Massachusetts has not worked out a new 
health education program since 1940.a7 It is even more unfortunate 
that this commendable program only has a fraction of the finances 
needed to implement it.a8 
General Laws, c. 71, §1, dating back to the 19th century, provides 
that instruction on the effects of narcotics "be given to all pupils in all 
schools under public control." 
Despite the statutory requirement, little, if anything, has been done. 
The Drug Abuse Advisory Committee of the state Department of Ed-
ucation has been working toward a program of prevention through 
education but has been given no funds at all by the legislature. 
Despite the lack of financial support, the committee members, rep-
resenting every interested agency in the state, have been working for 
two years without pay to bring basic, factual information to teachers 
and administrators caught up in the problems arising from drug ab-
use.a9 
One Boston journalist recently noted that drugs have pervaded our 
a4 Menninger, The Crime of Punishment at 208. 
1111 Boston Herald Traveler, Aug. 14, 1969, at 2, col. 5. 
86 Boston Herald Traveler, Oct. 29, 1969, Supplement at 6, col. 1. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
811 Id. at col. 2. 
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schools and have caused. an alarming truancy rate.40 In answering his 
own question as to what the Boston School Department was doing 
about the problem of drug abuse he said: 
Not too much apparently. I happened to be in a Roxbury 
school recently where the principal was reporting that more than 
100 of the students were "missing." To deal with this particular 
situation some officials from the attendance department suggested 
that a list of the missing pupils' names be sent to other schools in 
the area to see if any of them were in another school. 41 
Problems such as these can only be solved by financing drug education 
programs,. not by enacting legislation such as Section 213A. 
Another effort to stem drug abuse will most likely be rendered in-
effective due to the lack of proper financing. Attorney General Robert 
H. Quinn made known that f~rmer Governor Foster Furcolo was a 
leading choice "as chairman of his special advisory committee to spear-
head programs against drug abuse in Massachusetts."42 The committee 
would be composed of 15 to 20 persons who would set up programs to 
educate the public at all levels on the effects of drug abuse. However, 
it was reported that all those so asked to serve would receive no sal-
ary.48 
Without proper financing these programs may be rendered ineffec-
tive. Certainly, providing these funds is far less costly than the abridg-
ing of human rights. The President's Task Force Report on Narcotics 
and Drug Abuse" emphasized the need for drug education for profes-
sionals and the general public alike. The report noted that "the prob-
lem [is] clouded by misconceptions and distorted by persistent falla-
cies."411 
Another means by which drug addiction and sales may be hampered 
is through increased law enforcement. The President's task force 
strongly suggested that the flow of· drug traffic might be hindered if 
there were to be an increase in customs personnel and activity. The 
customs workload increases at a rate of 5 or 10 percent a year. An ad-
ditional 600 more customs officials are needed. "The need for more en-
forcement staff is ... more urgent now than ever."48 Speaking about 
the points at which drugs enter the United States, the task force said: 
... Illicit drugs regularly arrive at these points in significant 
quantities and in the hands of people who, while not at the high-
est, are at least not at the lowest level of the traffic. More frequent 
40 Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 1969, at 21, col. 4 (evening ed.). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Boston Globe, Oct. 2, 1969, at I, col. 1 (evening ed.). 
48 Id. at lI, col. 1. The committee is now· in operation and being directed by for. 
mer Governor Foster Furcolo. 
44 Task. Force On Narcotics and Drug Abuse, President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Narcotics and Drug Abuse (1967). 
411 Id. at 19. 
48Id. at 8. 
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interceptions of both the drugs and the people could reasonably 
be expected if the capacity to enforce customs laws was increased. 
Other important benefits, in the form of larger revenue collections 
and the suppression of smuggling generally, would also follow.47 
Mail inspection is also far below the frequency needed to deter the 
mailing of drugs. An additional 60 employees, requested by the com-
missioner of customs in 1965, would allow the proper amount of in-
spection.48 
An example of the type and degree of law enforcement needed to 
solve the drug problem was presented in September of 1969. President 
Nixon divulged the details of "Operation Intercept," in which the 
Mexican government was to cooperate with the United States in a 
massive search and seizure operation against narcotics. The program 
included remote sensor devices to detect opium and marihuana, remote 
sensors to pinpoint illegal border crossings, new Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration regulations, and the authority for customs officials to 
force down private aircraft.49 It would be absurd to ask the Massachu-
setts legislature to rely solely upon these federal activities. Yet, this 
sort of federal activity could be translated into local programming. 
For example, in August of 1969, Senator Joseph J. C. DiCarlo (D. Re-
vere) filed a bill that would provide for 50 state troopers to deal ex-
clusively with the drug problem. They would concern themselves with 
both drug users and drug traffic. It was reported that: 
DiCarlo's primary obstacle in passage of his proposal was a cost-
conscious Legislature. He feared that the House might balk at 
adding 50 state troopers to the payroll.50 
In summation, the Court's anxiety over the drug problem should 
not give way to an overly simple and dangerous solution. There are 
educational and enforcement projects, which have only been discussed 
briefly here, that could limit the drug problem considerably without 
the danger of punishing an innocent citizen for association with a pos-
sessor of narcotics. 
STANLEY R. BERKOWITZ 
§IO.9. Trespass to public property: Commonwealth v. Egleson.1 
On April 2, 1968, at 6:45 A.M., Egleson, the defendant, was arrested 
47 Ibid. 
48Id. at 9. 
49 Boston Herald Traveler. Sept. 9, 1969. at 1, col. 2. One practical effect of 
Operation Intercept has been the increased efforts by the Mexican government 
to enforce its narcotics control laws. See U.S. News and World Report. Dec. 29. 
1969. at 21. 
110 Boston Globe. Aug. 12. 1969. at Ill. col. I (evening ed.). 
§10.9. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 244 N.E.2d 589, cert. denied. lI95 U.s. lIlI6 
(1969). 
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for trespassing'inside a building owned by the city of Boston. The 
four-story building contained several facilities open to the public,2 
"numerous bulletins setting forth information of public interest,"3 
and an office of the Selective Service System, located on the fourth 
floor. Defendant, an instructor at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and a worker for the Boston Draft Resistance Group, was ar-
rested while attempting to inform a number of pre-inductees of their 
legal rights with regard to selective service induction. 
At 6: 15 that morning, the custodian in charge of the building had 
unlocked the doors, and "[t]hereafter the front doors were left open."4 
During the next 45 minutes, two employees of the draft board and 
about 20 pre-inductees entered the building. Under established pro-
cedure, pre-inductees check in with the draft board and obtain their 
files. They "normally arrive before 7 A.M. and stand in the lobby of 
the fourth floor ... until 7:S0 A.M.,"II at which time they are trans-
ported to the Boston Army Base. Between 6:20 and 6:25 A.M., the de-
fendant arrived with three girls and entered the building. Having 
been informed of the reason for their presence, the custodian told the 
defendant that he was interfering with the cleaning of the building, 
and requested that he leave.8 Egleson and the girls left peacefully. 
The defendant, accompanying a pre-inductee, then reentered at 
6:S5 A.M. and proceeded to the landing between the third and fourth 
floors. There he began talking with pre-inductees about their legal 
rights with respect to the draft.7 He neither forced conversation on his 
audience, nor did he advocate the· commission of any illegal act, and, 
in the words of the court, he "did not intend to create a disturbance 
or interfere with the cleaning,"B The custodian called the police, who 
gave defendant notice that if he left he would not be arrested.9 Egleson 
expressed his belief that he had a right to remain.10 
He was arrested, tried in the superior court, convicted of criminal 
trespass under G.L., c. 266, §120, and fined $20. An appeal was taken 
to the Supreme Judicial Court, where two issues were at bar: does 
Secti()n 120 apply to publicly owned as well as to privately owned 
property;l1 and, did the First Amendment, as applied through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, give defendant a right to be in the buiIding?12 
2 Civil Defense office, gymnasium and running track, dental clinic, baby clinic, 
offices of the Visiting Nurse Association, and a swimming pool, id. at 175-176, 
244 N.E.2d at 590·591. 
3Id. at 176, 244 N.E.2d at 591. 








12Id. at 178, 244 N.E.2d at 592. 
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HELD: The criminal sanctions of Section 120 apply to trespass to 
publicly owned property;18 and, on the facts of the case, defendant had 
no constitutional right to be in the building.u 
This comment criticizes the Court's holding on both issues, and, 
more generally, reviews the historical distinction between trespass to 
publicly owned and privately owned property, and concludes that the 
present statutory provisions covering trespass to property to which 
individuals have a First Amendment right of access are unconstitu-
tional. The relevant statutes are Section 120,111 the statute applied in 
Egleson, and Section 123,16 a limited public property trespass statute, 
which was amended during the 1969 SURVEY year to encompass prop-
erty of public institutions of higher education.17 
Massachusetts case law has implicitly recognized in certain cases a 
difference between trespass to privately owned property and trespass to 
publicly owned property.18 Defenses to the charge of trespass have 
emerged in the form of rights to be on the property. III Generally, un-
licensed entry to private property is prohibited. However, if a govern-
ment health inspector,20 a highway commissioner21 or a police officer22 
is accused of trespass to privately owned property, he has a defense to 
18Id. at 177-17B, 244 N.E.2d at 592. 
14Id. at 17B-179, 244 N.E.2d at 592. 
111 G.L., c. 266, §120, reads in part: "Whoever, without right, enters or remains 
in or upon the dwelling house, buildings, boats or improved or enclosed land. 
wharf or pier of another. after having been forbidden so to do by the person 
who has the lawful control of said premises. either directly or by notice posted 
thereon, shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty dollars." 
16 Acts of 1969, c. 362. amending G.L., c. 266, §125: "Whoever willfully trespasses 
upon land or premises belonging to the commonwealth, or to any authority es-
tablished by the general court for purposes incidental to higher education, ap-
purtenant to a public institution of higher education, the state prison, state prison 
colony, Massachusetts reformatory, reformatory for women. state farm, Tewksbury 
hospital, Soldiers' Home in Massachusetts. Soldiers' Home in Holyoke, any public 
institution for the care of insane, feeble minded or epileptic persons, any Massa-
chusetts training school or state charitable institution, or upon land or premises 
belonging to any county and appurtenant to a jail, house of correction or court-
house, or whoever, after notice from an officer of any of said institutions to leave 
said land, remains thereon, shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than three months." 
17 Acts of 1969, c. 562. 
18 Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, B9 Mass. 158 (18611); cf •• Thurlow 
v. Crossman, 556 Mass. 24B. 250-251. 145 N.E.2d B12. Bl4 (1957); Winslow v. Gifford 
60 Mass. 1127, 3110 (IB50). 
III The discussion here does not consider the many common law defenses to 
the charge of trespass on privately owned and used property by a private in-
dividual. See generally 1 Restatement of Torts Second §§191-203 (1965). 
20 Thurlow v. Crossman, 1136 Mass. 24B, 250-51. 143 N.E.2d B12. B14 (1957); BOp. 
Mass. Atty. Gen. at 134 (1927). 
21 Winslow v. Gifford, 60 Mass. at 330. 
22Id. at 3110; Barnard v. Bartlett, 64: Mass. 501 (IB52); Oystead v.Shed, III 
Mass. 519 (IBI6). On the authority of police to enter privately owned property. 
see also I Restatement of Torts Second §§204-209 (1965). 
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the cmnplaint if ~ is on the property to fulfill his official duties.23 As 
the Court said in Jan early case, a 'govern.ment surveyor has a right to 
enter upon private property as long as "the entry is reasonably neces.. 
sary ... it ill but a' temporary one, and [is] accompanied with no 
unnecessary damage."J!I" 
Entry upOn public property is also limited by the law of trespass. 
However, the various rights to enter and remain upon such property 
are broader and more numerous than those relating to private property. 
Certain, ,publicly owned property such as streets and parks has tradi-
tionally bee~ subject'~o'uses which would constitute trespass if private 
property were involved.211 ,For example, an 1868 case26 stated that by 
reason of a Massachusetts Bay Colony ordinance of 1647, ponds larger 
than ten Beres are deeriu~d to be publi.c . .27 The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that, the defendantJ who entered ,upon su& property and carried 
away ke were not guilty of tr.Upass;~8 The Court stressed the impor-
tanceof an individual's right to be on such property: 
I~, wpuld,'seeQl' to att~rd s<)JI1~ ,confirmation of the opinion that 
,the orq.inance of 1647 was,desigriedto establish a large and impor-
, tant pubIlc fight, that the provision concerning ponds is included 
in the same chapter of the colony laws which secures the right of 
free speech in courts and town meetings. . . .29 
, In'addition, in Hague v. CIO,80 the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Constitutiqn ~tabUshes an individual's right of access to 
certain publicly owned Pro,perl:y. Previously. in Davis v. Massachu-
setts,81 the Supremc:: , Coutt, affirming the Massachusetts Court, had up-
held the constitutionality ofa Boston city ordinance which prohibited 
spt:ak~l)g o~ city' public ground'S without a permit from the mayor. 
In llague this holding w¥ obStensibly distinguished but for prac-
tical purposes repudiat{!i:J,.82rD.'Hague, the Supreme Court had before 
ita regulation investing an official with complete discretion to license 
meetings in streets and"other: public places. In holding the regulation 
., 
I • i '" 1, "" 'I ,23,Th~ kinda of: entry ,a,re .D!lw u,,,ally regul~ted by statutes, e.g., G.L., c. 94, 
§~lll), ,~:(inspectiQ~ ot. ~~ and milk produ~); G1..., c. lll, §9 (inspection of 
foOd and drugs); G.L~, l~l ~~~ §\O (award of d~ages if~spector does damages). 
2. 60 Mass. at 11110. See also, Onorato Bros. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 
11116 ~jI88> ~ l~, N~.2d 1189 (1957). .},;" , 
,,21!l;Iaguev. CIQ, ~7 ,U.s.,~96 (1~~); " 
26 Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stodarrd, 89 Mass. 158 (18611). 
271d. at 171. ' , , ' 
28 Ibid. " 
29 Id. at '168. ' i 
80 Hague v. ClO, B07,U.s. 496 (1959). 
81167 U.s. 411 (1897). 
82 Ha~e v. CIO, 507 u.s. at 515: see also, Niemotko v. Maryland, !140 U.s. 268, 
t'/9 (1!95t) (Frankfurter; J., c:ondmins): "Ail attempt to derive from dicta in the 
~avi8:caie 't!'e !i~ht ota dtyto ~ercise 'any pbwer over its parks, however, ar-
bitrary or discrllDlDatory, w .. :rejeded in'Hague v. C.I.O •••• " 
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unconstitutional, the Court established at least a limited right of access 
to publicly owned streets and parks for the purPdse of: appropriately 
exercising First Amendment freedoms.ss This right of access to public 
property for the exercise of freedom of speech is one of the issues in 
Egleson. 
Thus, publicly owned property is subject to different rights of access 
than private property. As a result, the defenses to a charge of trespass 
to each are different. Massachusetts, however, has one general criminal 
trespass statute, G.L., c. 266, §120. It applies to both private and pub-
licly owned property. It purports to acknowledge the existence ,of 
rights which serve as defenses to a charge of trespass, in that it pro-
scribes entry to or remaining upon property "without right." As dis-
cussed below, however, when Section 120 comes into coriflict with the 
guarantees of the First Amendment of the Constitution, it is inade-
quate. In addition to this general trespass statute, G.L., c. 266, §128, 
pertains ,to entry to or presence upon the premises of certain enumer-
ated public institutions. Unlike Section 120, it contains a disjunctive 
clause which can operate as an absolute prohibition of presence on the 
subject premises, without respect to right: "or whoever, after notice 
from an officer of any said institutions to leave said land,' remains 
thereon, shall be punished .... "S4 ' 
In 1969 Section 128 was amended to cover public institutions of 
higher education.slS Section 128 applies to specific kinds of publicly 
owned property and coverage has been continually expanded since its 
inception in 1885.s8 In its original form, Section 128 covered only tres-
pass to the state prison and reformatories and county owned land 
appurtenant to jails.ST Subsequent revisions added to the list of insti-
tutions protected.s8 Section 128 provides a harsher penaltYS9 for trespass 
than Section 120. Section 128 proscribes two separate offenses: "willful 
trespass," which incorporates the concept of absence of right;40 or, 
mere failure to leave the enumerated premises after notice. Eitl1er is an 
offense under Section 128. However, trespass will not lie under Section 
120 unless there is both a trespass "without right" and notice to leave. 
On its face, the disjunctive clause of Section 128, "or whoever, after 
88 "The time immemorial from which the streets and parks have 'been ,require.d 
to be held open for First Amendment activities dates from 1939; when Hague 
v. Cl.O . .•. was decided." In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 849, 434P.2d 353, 355, 
64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1967). 
84 G.L., c. 266, §123. 
81S Acts of 1969, c. 362. 
38 Acts of 1885, c. 303. 
STlbid. 
88 Acts of 1885, c. 305; Acts of 1905, c. 434; Acts of 1911, cc. 1M, 181, 194; Acts 
of 1913, c. 404; Acts of 1918, c. 257, §307; Acts of 1931, c. 426, §308; Acts of 1941, 
c. lI44, §27; Acts of 1958, c. 613, §8E; Acts of 1959, c. 213; Acts of 1960, c. lI15; 
Acts of 1969, c. 362. 
89 See notes 15 and 16 supra. 
40 Harper and James, The Law of Torts §l.l1, atll8 (1950). 
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notice. . to leave said land, remains . . . shall be punished," can 
be invoked .without regard to whether the intruder has a right to be on 
the property. Mere refusal to leave constitutes an ofEense.41 
From the examination below of cases which consider the appropriate-
ness of publicly owned property as a forum for First Amendment free-
doms, it can be seen that the holding in Egleson that the building is 
not an appropriate forum is incorrect. Egleson had a First Amendment 
right which was an adequate defense to the charge of trespass under 
Section 120. The Court's misapplication of Section 120 merely serves to 
affirm that Section 120 is unconstitutional when applied to public 
property. 
Before comparing Egleson with other cases involving the proper 
forum for First Amendment rights, one should realize that some of 
them involved breach of the peace42 rather than trespass laws.43 The 
former directly regulate44 the First Amendment freedoms of speech, 
assembly, and petition for redress of grievances. Trespass statutes pro-
tect property, but the result of implementation of a trespass statute 
may also be an unconstitutional curtailment of First Amendment 
freedoms,411 The Supreme Court has declared statutes of the former 
type unconstitutional by reason of vagueness or overbreadth,46 Al-
though the Court has never invalidated a trespass statute for vagueness 
or overbreadth, it has rectified misapplications of trespass statutes.47 
This seeming reluctance to invalidate trespass statutes is due to the fact 
that the court has seldom been called on to consider the constitution-
U An alternative to this reading is that the offense of failure to leave "said 
land" after notice means a failure to leave land which has been willfully trespassed 
upon. This reading would· make trespass a necessary element of the offense of 
failure to leave after notice. However, this reading of the statute is interpretive 
and not literal. 
42 Brown v. Louisiana, lI8l1 U.S. llli (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, lI79 U.S. 536 
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, lI72 U.S. 229 (1963). 
43 In the following discussion, the cases which deal with trespass or trespass 
statutes are: Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
lI91 U.s. lI08 (1968); Mderley v. Florida, lI85 U.S. lI9 (1966); Bouie v. Columbia, 
lI78 U.S. 347 (1964); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(1967); Parrish v. Municipal Court, Modesto Judicial District, 258 Cal. App.2d 
497,65 Cal. Rptr. 862, (1968); In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d. 34,49 Cal. Rptr. 322 
(1966); Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158 (1863); State v. 
Kirk, 84 N.J. Super. 151, 201 A.2d 102 (1964). 
44 For a discussion of direct versus indirect regulation of speech, see Note, 49 
B.U.L. Rev. 346 (1969). 
411 E.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 
U.s. !I08 (1968); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(1967). That trespass statutes, like statutes which directly regulate First Amend-
ment freedoms, can be misapplied is suggested by Justice Douglas in his dissent 
in Mderley:"Today a trepass law is used to peilalize people for eXercising a 
constitutional right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breach-of-the-peace 
statute, a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end." 385 U.S. at 56. 
46 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, lI79 U.s. 536 (1965). 
47 Amalgamated Food Employee. Vni9ll Local 590 v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 
~08 (1968). 
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ality of trespass statutes which contlict with First Amendment freedoms 
exercised on property used by the general public.48 The cases discussed 
below, however, can legitimately be used in reference to a trespass situ-
ation because they all involve the problem of defining a proper situs 
and manner for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 
In deciding whether the exercise of First Amendment freedoms on 
publidy owned property will be allowed, courts examine certain char-
acteristics of the property and the form of the demonstration.49 One 
basic determination about the property is whether it is used in a public 
or a private manner.1iO Regardless of who owns the property, if it has 
a private use (private residence,51 prison,52 or state farm58), access to it 
will be severely limited and freedom of speech and assembly will not 
serve as rights to enter or remain. If the property has traditionally been 
used in a public manner, the exercise of First Amendment rights will 
usually be allowed thereon.54 The court in Egleson relies on A.dderley 
v. Florida55 for its conclusion that the building, housing the draft 
board, is "not a propitious . . . place"rl6 for dialogue on the draft. 
This is an unjustified application of the case. In A.dderley, the Supreme 
Court affirmed convictions for trespass to jail grounds. The Court said, 
"Jails, built for security purposes, are not open [to the public]."111 
The situation in Egleson is very different. The building involved con-
tained bulletins of public interest, offices of public facilities, and public 
athletic facilities, all of which are implicit invitations to the general 
public to enter the building. 
In Brown v. Louisiana,58 the Supreme Court reversed breach of the 
peace convictions of five black men who refused to leave a small branch 
library traditionally reserved for whites on the grounds that defendants' 
actions did not fall within the statute. The court went further, stating 
that a library is a proper forum for the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms, and that "even if the accused action were within the scope 
of the statutory instrument . . . , we would have to hold that the 
statute cannot constitutionally be applied to punish petitioners' ac-
48 In Adderley v. Florida, S85 U.s. S9 (1966), the Court refused to declare 
vague a state trespass statute similar to G.L., c. 266, §120. However, the property 
involved in that case, jail grounds, had a private use, although publicly owned. 
Unlike the building in Egleson. the property was not open to the general public; 
d .• Bouie v. Columbia. S78 U.s. S47 (1964). 
49 Adderley v. Florida. S85 U.s. S9 (1966). See generally. Regulation of Demon-
strations. 80 Harv. L. Rev. 177S (1967). 
IiO Wolin v. Port of New York Authority. 268 F. Supp. 855, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
all·d. S92 F.2d 8S (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied. S9S U.S. 940 (1968). 
51 Commonwealth v. Richardson. SIS Mass. 6S2. 6S8. 48 N.E.2d 678. 682 (I94S). 
52 G.L .• c. 266. §12S. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Hague v. CIO. S07 U.S. 496 (19S9) (publicly used. publicly owned property); 
Marsh v. Alabama. S62 U.S. SOl (1946) (publicly used private property). 
55 S85 U.s. S9 (1966). 
116 Commonwealth v. Egleson. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178. 244 N.E.2d at 592. 
117 S85 U.s. at 41. 
118 S8S U.s. lSI (1966). 
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tions; .: .AI! The building in Egleson, like this library reading room, 
exists for the use of the public. Mere presence in the building should 
not be'a punishable . offense. Two courts have held that transportation 
terminals are also proper forums for First Amendment activities.60 Just 
as "certain portions of the Terminal (such as the concourse) may be 
used. by. members of the' public for the purpose of patronizing shops 
or other services,"61the public is invited and expected to, enter and 
use the serVices of ·the building in Egleson. On the authority and reason-
ing of. theSe: cases, Egleson's presence in the building, absent any spe-
cific oifense;,should·not have been condemned. 
In detet'IIlining. the appropriateness of a situs for First Amendment 
freedoms, several other factors are traditionally considered: the appro-
priateness of ·the loca:tion to the subject of the demonstration;62 the 
availability of the same audience at another location;8s and whether or 
not the building is open for business. a. With regard to the first of these 
points, one may deduce a general rule that the more private and 
narrow the ·function of thc!' property (e.g., a privately owned shopping 
center,61i World's Fair gro'unds leased from a city,66 a public jaiI67), the 
closer the relationship must be between that function and the pro-
testerS~ cause .. Conversely, where the pr.Qperty 'has a wide public use 
(e.g., streets and parks,68 transportation terminals8"), only the form of 
the demonstraiiODt, and not the 8ubject matter, can be restricted. As 
suggestt:d labove, it 'would seem that the building in Egleson has a 
general public use, and therefore the Court should only concern itself 
withttheacceptabilitr of defendant's behavior and not his message.70 
1i9Id. ~t i~." : I, I, 
60 Wolin v. Port of ~ew York Authority, 592 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
893 U.S. 940(1965); Iii re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 484 P.2d 858, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
97 (1967). Contra. State ". K.,irk, 84 NJ. Super. 151, 201 A.2d 102 (1964) • 
. 61 268 F. Supp. ~t 860: . 
62 Ad~~I~yv~Flori~, 585 u.s. 89, ~9 (i966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
as State v. KlrkJ 84 N.J. Super. 15Vl57, 201 A.2d 102,106 (1964). 
64 Parrish v. Municipal Court, Modesto Judicial District, 258 Cal. App. 2d 497, 
66 Cal. RptrJ862 (l968) •. In re:BacoD, 240 Cal. App. 2d 84, 49 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1966) . 
. 61i In Amalgamated FOOd Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
891 U.S.,808 (1968)."the.court states that it .Would be a different question if 
petitioner's pickedag' "was ,not thus directly related in its purpose to the use 
to which the shopping center property was being put." 891 U.S. at 820 n.9. 
66Farmer v. :Mbacs, 282 F.Supp. 154j'161 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
87 Adderley v. Florida, 885 u.s. 59 (1966) . 
. !l8 Hague v. -(:IOr 807 U.S. 496 (1959). 
69 In re Hoffmm, 67 Cal. 2d 845,484 P,24 3511, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967): "In 
thisrespect.,atailway statioD!' like a street 'or' park. Noise and commotion are 
characteristic. • • • The railroads seek neither privacy within nor exclusive pos. 
session of their station. They, therefore, cannot invoke the law of trespass . • . 
to : prgfeet those' inteTCllta." 
70 When free ~. is ; ~etdsed in a recognized public forum, the content of 
the speech will be censored only in extreme situations, such as when violence 
may reJlult. See ~erallyRegulation of Demonstrations, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1775. The 
content of defendant's speech in Egleson raises no such problems, and this note 
does not explore the intricacies of when content is censored. . 
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However, the Court states flatly 'that a building containing a draft 
board is not a "propitious" place at which to, discuss t:le rights of 
draftees.71 Assuming arguendo that the function of the building is so 
limited that it must be closely related to defendant's cause, the Court's 
holding still contradicts Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza72,which involved union picketing of a non-
union store in a privately owned shopping plaza. The Supreme Coutt 
upheld the exercise of First Amendment rights on the ground that a 
nonunion shop is an appropriate situs for picketing to induce unioniza-
tion.7s A building containing a draft board is as logicaland appropriate 
a location for dialogue on selective service law as a nonunion shop is 
for union leafleting and picketing. 
The Court in Egleson also suggests that the defendant could have 
meaningfully addressed his audience outside the building.7• This line 
of reasoning is in conflict with the United States Supreme Court in 
Schneider v. State.TIS There the Court declared invalid municipal'ordi-
nances prohibiting handbilling in streets and alleys but allowing it in 
other public places. The Court stated "one is not to have the exercise 
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on ,the plea 
that it may be exercised in some other place."76 o.n the facts qf Egleson, 
meaningful conversation with the pre-inductees would have been, im-
possible outside the building. The pre-inductees arrived separately and 
were not assembled until they were inside the building., A similar 
situation arose in Wolin v. Port of New Y01k Authority,TT a 'case con-
cerning the exercise of First Amendment rights in a transportation 
terminal. In Wolin, a federal district court accepted logic similar to 
that offered by counsel for Egleson: : ' 
... plaintiff desired to engage in such activities [setting 1:lP a 
table, carrying placards, leafleting, and talking with pedestrians 1 
inside the Terminal rather than be relegated to the sidewalk Heri" 
meters for the reason that plaintiff's communication of his group's 
messages [opposition to the Viet Nam war] to pedestrians waiting 
inside the Terminal would be more effective than attempts to, 
communicate views to persons using the sidewalks to enter :or 
leave the Terminal, since passengers waiting inside the Terminal 
concourse had more time and hence were more receptive th~n 
those hurrying across the sidewalk to or from the Terminal,1s " 
For this same reason, Egleson should have been allowed to address 
his audience inside the building containing the cJraft ,board." . ; 
71 Commonwealth v. Egleson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178, 244 N.E.2dat 592. 
72591 U.s. 50s (1968). ' ' " 
781d. at 519-520. 
7. Commonwealth v. Egleson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178, 244 N.E.2d at.$92; 
TIS 508 u.s. 147 (1959). 
781d. at 165. 
77268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), alI'd, 592 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. d~nied, 
595 U.S. 940 (1968). ' 
78 ld. at 858. 
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If the building were not open for business, the Egleson Court's find-
ing that the defendant had no right to be there would be correct.TO 
However, the Court does not say that the building was not open for 
business, but only that the hour chosen by Egleson "was not a pro-
pitious time."80 Thus, the Court's equivocation and the fact that the 
draft board personnel and 20 or so pre-inductees were in the building, 
and, in addition, the fact that the custodian had opened the doors for 
the day all indicate that the building was open for business in some 
sense. 
Since, for the above reasons, the inside of the building was a proper 
situs for exercising First Amendment rights, and the defendant there-
fore had a right to be where he was, o~e must now detennine whether 
he forfeited that right by his behavior; that is, whether his activities 
interfered excessively with the valid competing state interest of the 
proper functioning of the selective service office.81 If he were disrup-
tive, he would have lost his cons~itutional right to be in the building.82 
This balancing of interests test was enunciated as early as 1863 by the 
Supreme Judicial Court:83 
. . . The right of any individual to use for his own pleasure or 
profit such a place of public resort must be limited by the rule that 
the similar right of others is not to be impaired or infringed.84 
This rule also prohibits.interference with a so called "public right."811 
Defendant in Egleson did not interfere with the rights of others. 
When arrested, he was alone, rather than part of a large crowd of 
demonstrators which could be disruptive merely by its presence; this 
factor is at least considered in several cases.86 He did not enter the 
draft board itself, but stayed on the landing between floors, thereby 
minimiting the possibility of interference with the office. The men he 
was talking to were not actively being processed but were merely wait-
ing for the bus to the army base. In the words of the Court, "he 
Tt Cases cited at note 54 'Upr4. 
80 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178,244 N.E.2d at 592. 
31 The Court in Egleson is silent on the question of whether defendant's pres-
ence interfered with the cleaning of the building. However, even if defendant 
had interfered. the Supreme Court has held that First Amendment rights may 
not be abridged in a similar situation. Schneider v. State, !l08 U.S. 147, 162-16!1 
(19!19). 
32 "[AJ perlOn could not exercise this liberty [of free speech] by taking his 
stand in the middle of a aowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and main-
tain his position to the stoppage of all traffic ..•. " Schneider v. State, !lOS U.S. at 
160. However, the right of free speech will prevail over minor inconveniences to 
the government: "States cannot consistently with our Constitution abridge those 
[First Amendment] freedoms to obviate slight inconveniences or annoyances." Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 u.s. 559, 564 (1965). 
33 Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158 (I 86!1). 
84Id. at 170. 
811 Id. at 171. .. 
88 COx v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 5!16, 541 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.s. 229, 251-252 (196!1). 
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did not intend to create a disturbance .... The defendant's purpose 
could at best be of no help, and probably would be a deterrent, to the 
efficient work of the Draft Board."81 However, there was no explicit 
finding that the defendant in fact did interfere in any way with the 
functioning of the draft board. Thus, Egleson is different from Adder-
ley, which was cited by the Supreme Judicial Court88 for support of 
defendant's conviction, in that the Adderley holding was based in part 
on the fact that the demonstration interfered with the functioning of 
the jai1.89 
In Egleson, the Court was also concerned with deterring possible 
future intrusions. The Court feared that: "If the defendant . . . could 
enter with one pre-inductee, an indefinite number of others could, 
equally unsolicited, enter with one or more other pre-inductees."9o 
The inequity of this logic is pointed out in Wolin v. Port of New York 
Authority: 
The contention that the operation of the Terminal building 
would be stifled by a flock of leafleters subsequent to a decision 
adverse to the [port Authority] carries little weight since the Court 
is dealing only with the rights of the plaintiff and those whom he 
represents.91 
Thus, the rights of Egleson, based only on the merits of his own actions, 
should have been the sole determination of the Court. 
Since, then, the building in Egleson was a proper forum for First 
Amendment freedoms, and the defendant did not, in the exercise of 
free speech, forfeit his right to be present and speak, the Court erred 
in affirming his conviction. The Egleson decision overlooks the histori-
cal distinction between the offenses of trespass to privately owned and 
publicly owned property. The Court ignores Massachusetts92 and Su-
preme Court cases93 which hold that individuals often have rights to 
use publicly owned property for purposes forbidden on privately owned 
property. Specifically, the constitutional right to First Amendment free-
doms in publicly owned buildingsD4 is denied in Egleson. The Court 
misapplies Section 120, a statute intended and more suited to cover 
privately owned property. The Court implicitly sanctions the practice 
of investing government employees with the discretion to determine 
whether individuals have a First Amendment right of access to the 
public property in question. As discussed below, the United States 
Supreme Court has consistently rejected this practice. In short, al-
87 Commonwealth v. Egleson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 177·178, 244 N.E.2d at 
591·592. 
88Id. at 179, 244 N.E.2d at 592. 
89 Adderley v. Florida, 885 U.S. 89, 45 (1966). 
to Commonwealth v. Egleson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178,244 N.E.2d at 592. 
91268 F. Supp. at 868; the principle was first enunciated by this same court in 
Farmer v. Moses, 282 F. Supp. 154, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
92 Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158 (1868). 
03 Hague v. CIO, 807 U.S. 496 (1989). 
84 Brown v. Louisiana, 888 U.s. 181 (1966). 
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though the Supreme Judicial Court acknowledges the existence of all 
these developments when applied'to public property as a situs for free 
speech, nevertheless it seems to treat the building in Egleson like pri-
vately owned property. It summarily dismisses defendant'sconstitu-
tional right to be in the building withOut adequately supporting the 
state's position. Thus, in Egleson the Courtaffinned that section 120 
can be applied unconstitutionally by upholding defendant's convic-
tion. 
When Section 120 is applied to property owned and used' by the 
public, it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
by reason of overbreadth.tII Secti6ri 120 :grants complete discretion to 
public officials (e.g., the custodian98 in EglestJn) to determine whether 
or not the alleged trespasser has a First Amendment right to be on the 
property. As discussed above this determination is complex; Section 
120 requires public officials to decide whether the property is a proper 
forum for free speech and whether the intruder's behaviQr is objection-
able. The words "without right" are, too broad to ~upply ~deline,s to 
the officials vested with the discretion or, to potential trespassers. Thus, 
First Amendment violations are inherently possible'lJla1dng Section 120 
unconstitutional. 
When Section 120 is used to protect privately owned property, it is 
constitutional. In most private property trespass situations, since thetie 
is no First Amendment right to be 'on the property, whoever has "law-
ful control" of the premises can demand thatthe intruder leal"e.87 How-
ever, when an individual seeks to' exercise a First Amendment right 
on public property, the Supreme Court has traditionally preferred regU-
lation by specific laws rather than regulations, based on the ,broad dis-
cretion of officials8s for two reasons. First, individual inembers of the 
public are entided to know eXactly what conduct is forbidden; and 
second, specific rules decrease the possibility of selective enforcement 
of the law which can result from pverly' btoad official discretion. 
In attacking a trespass law for overbreadth, there is no extensive 
811 See generally Amsterdam, The Void· far-Vagueness Docninein the ,Supreme 
Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
8e It is not clear from the decision in Egleson whether the Court was acknowl· 
edging that the custodian or the police officer, ~ad the authj»ity to give di:f~dant 
notice to leave. Commonwealth v. Richardson, IU8 Mass. 682, 48 N.E. 2d 678 
(l94lJ). would seem to stand for the, proposition that onij' the penon m full 
legal control of the premises, and not a police officer who hllJ, been, 'called .in, 
has the authority to give such notice; d., Fittgerald v. Lewis, 164 Mass. 495, 41 
N.E. 687 (1895). 
87 Commonwealth v. Richardson, lJIlJ Mass. 682. 6lJ8. 48 N.E.2d 678, 682 (194!). 
8S "There is [al plain requirement for laws and regulations to be drawn 10 
as to give citizens fair warning as to what i, iUegal; for regulation of conduct 
that involves freedom of speech and assembly· not to be 10 broad in scope as to 
stifle First Amendment freedoms '. • • for appropriate limitations on the discretion 
of public officials where speech and assembly are intertwined. with regulated con-
duct; and for all such lawl and regulations to be applied with an equal hand." 
Cox v. Louisiana, lJ79 U.S. 559, 574 (1965). ' ' 
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Supreme ~outt.precedent,911.but argument. can 'be made by analogy. 
The Court has insisted that other kinds of laws' which directly regulate 
Fint Amendment freedoms be extremely explicit and invest a mini-
mum of discretion in officials. Among the earliest cases to consider the 
matter of unconstitutionally broad discretion were the licensing cases. 
The ordinance in Hague v. CIO enabled a public official to deny a 
permit for a public meeting if, in his opinion, the meeting would be 
disorderly. The ordinance could thus "be made an instrument of arbi-
trary suppression of free expr~ssion of views,"l00 and was invalidated 
by .the Court~ In Schneider v. State, the Supreme Court considered an 
ordinance which "banned unlicensed communication of any views ..• 
from door to door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power of 
a police officer to determine, as a censor, what literature may be dis-
tributed from house to house. . . ."101 The Court held the ordinance 
void as applied to the petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness arrested for 
soliciting funds without a permit, in that it gave a public official the 
power to act arbitrarily. This broad discretion was considered an un-
warranted abridgement of freedom of speech.102 
Procedurall" Section 120 is different from these licensing laws in 
that the statute- takes effect after the alleged offense. However, the 
Supreme Court ha$ made it clear that the net effect of infringement of 
speech is the same whether the statute requires licensing of protected 
activities or goes into effect after the fact. Thus, in Cox v. Louisiana,108 
the Court revened petitioner's conviction for obstructing a public pas-
sage, stating: 
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official' to deter-
mine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will 
not·. . • either by use of a statute providing a system of broad dis-
cretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the equivalent of 
99 See note 48-' supra. Support for the contention that trespass statutes which 
confUctwith First Amendment freedoms must, like statutes which direcdy regulate 
these freedoms, bespecifi:c and grant minimal discretion to public officials is 
found in Justice Douglas' dissent in Adderley: 
"[It is going too far to say] that the 'custodians' of the public property in his 
discretion can decide when public places shall be used for the communication of 
ideas, especially the constitutional right to assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances. • • • It gives him the awesome power to decide whose ideas may be 
expressed and who shall be denied a place to air their claims and petition their 
government. ••• (Before] a First Amendment right may be curtailed under the 
guise of a criminal law, any evil that may be collateral to the exercise of the 
right, must be isolated and defined in a 'narrowly drawn' statute •••• " 585 U.S. 
at 54~55. ' 
100 Hague v. CIO,50i u.s. 496, 516 (1959). 
101 Schneider v. State, !I08 U.s. 147, 165 (1959). See also, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
510 u.s. 296 (1940). 
102 Schneider v. State, 508 U.S. at 164. 
108 579 u.s. 556 (1965). 
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such a system by selective enforcetpent of an ex1;femely broad 
prohibitory statute.10• 
There, the statute, as applied by the state court to the fact situation, 
allowed "unfettered discretion in local officials in the regulation of the 
use of the streets,"lOIl which resulted in a denial of petitioner's First 
Amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabamal08 also equates licens-
ing statutes and penal statutes which invest public officials with un-
fettered discretion over behavior which involves protected freedoms. 
In that case the Court declared unconstitutional a statute forbidding 
the publicizing of facts of a labor dispute. In the Court's discussion, 
the danger inherent in statutes like General Laws, Chapter 266, Sec-
tion 120, is outlined: 
It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but 
the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes 
the danger to freedom o{ discussion .... A like threat is inherent 
. in a penal statute . . . which does not aim specifically at evils 
within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, 
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circum-
stances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech .... The 
existence of such a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and 
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against 
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a 
continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion 
that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.10T 
The same susceptibility to selective enforcement is present in Sec-
tion 120. In Egleson, the Court seems to condemn defendant's message 
rather than his presence: 
This was not a propitious time nor place for a self-appointed 
layman who was a [member of a] draft resistance group to offer his 
ideas on constitutional or other "rights" or to volunteer exposi-
tions of grounds of opposition to the Vietnam War.108 
If defendant had entered the building to congratulate the draftees 
on their compliance with the Sdective Service System, it is doubtful 
that a trespass conviction would have resulted. 
Section 123, a limited public trespass statute, grants even broader 
discretion to public officials than Section 120, and is. patently uncon-
stitutional on its face. The weakness of Section 120 is that it grants to 
public officials discretion to determine whether the intruder has a 
right to be on the property. As discussed at the outset of this note, 
104Id. at 557·558. 
lOll Id. at 558. 
1081110 U.s. 88 (1940). 
lOT Id. at 97·98. 
108 Commonwealth v. Egleson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178,244 N.E.2d at 592. 
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Section 123 proscribes two separate offenses: Willful trespass or mere 
failure to leave the property after notice. The fact that the statute is 
stated in the disjunctive indicates that willful trespass is not an element 
of the second offense. Therefore, the public official does not even have 
to consider whether the individual has a right to be on the property 
to invoke the second clause of Section 123. His discretion is complete 
and without qualification. 
Prior to the 1969 amendment, Section 123 pertained to enumerated, 
specific premises used in a private way. That is, like private residential 
property, the listed premises were used in such a way that any entry by 
private individuals would by definition by considered an interference. 
Premises of the kind listed were closed to First Amendment activities. 
Since it pertained to such special, limited kinds of property, the failure 
of Section 123 to make provisions for rights of entry did not render 
the statute unconstitutional. The 1969 amendment, however, has ex-
panded it to include public institutions of higher education, property 
to which certain individuals have a First Amendment right of access. 
The second clause of the amended statute does not, on its face, recog-
nize any right whatsoever to be on the property. Unconstitutionally, 
broad discretion to admit or to expel individuals is thereby invested 
in agents of the state. 
The right of access to public university property for demonstrating 
was first established in 1967 in Hammond v. South Carolina State 
College.109 There the court declared that a college rule requiring prior 
approval of demonstrations was an invalid prior restraint on First 
Amendment freedoms. The court rejected the proposition that the 
entire college campus is comparable to the jail grounds in Adderley, 
and therefore totally immune from First Amendment activities.110 
Rather, relying on Edwards v. South Carolina,111 where the Supreme 
Court condoned demonstrating to express· grievances at a state house, 
the court in Hammond concluded: "I am not persuaded that the 
campus of a state college is not similarly available for the same pur-
poses for its students,"112 
The same conclusion is reached in several decisions subsequent to 
Hammond.11s In Barker v. Hardway114 the court refused to grant stu-
dents an injunction against the enforcement of college suspensions in-
curred for a disruptive demonstration at a football game. However, in 
the decision, the court recognizes that state university property is often 
a proper situs of First Amendment freedoms: 
109272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). 
110Id. at 950-951. 
111 !l72 u.s. 229 (196!1). 
112 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. at 951. 
1111 Cf., Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 7!1 (2d Cir. 1968); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ. 
291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968); see generally Van Alstyne, The Student As 
University Resident, 45 Denver L.J. 582 (1968); Comment, 45 Denver L.J. 622 
(1968). 
114 28!1 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), aff'd, !l99 F.2d 6!18 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, !l94 u.s. 905 (1969). 
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True it is that enrollment in school does not mean the student 
surrenders any of his constitutional rights; •.. Nor can it be 
gainsaid that the plaintiffs and their fellow demonstrators had the 
right under the First Amendment to bring their grievances to the 
attention of [the college president]. and10ther tollege officials in 
attendance at the football game ... but when they [were] abu-
sive and disorderly . . . they thereby exceeded this· constitutional 
privilege and forfeited its protection.11I ' 
The First Amendment right of access tq publi.; university property, 
then, is still in the process of emerging and. being cJ.efined. ~owever, 
what seems settled is that such property is not of a private or restricted 
nature. The considerations involved in determining the First 4mend-
ment right of access to public property generally (e.g., streets, parks, 
jails) seem to be the relevant considerations wh~n access, to public uni-
versity property is sought. Ther<;iore" SectiQn 123, which categprizes 
public university property with other m,ore restri~ted property and 
gives the person in legal control absolute discretion over who has access 
to the property, is unconstitutional by reason of overbreadth. 
The constitutional flaw of Section 12~ is clearly, illustrated in 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham.116 There the ordinance under consider-
ation was structurally the same as Section 12~ but proscribed loitering. 
Although the Supreme Court held the ordinance constitut~onal as 
applied by the state court, it nevertheless found it unconstitutionally 
overbroad on its face: 
On its face, the here relevant paragraph of [the ordinance]' sets 
out two separate and disjunctive offenses. The paragraph makes it 
an offense to "so stand, loiter or walk upon any stteet or sidewalk 
. • . as to obstruct free passage over, on or along said street or side-
walk." The paragraph makes it "also .. ; unlawful for any person ; 
to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk . . . after having , 
been requested by any police officer to move on. . . ." [Emphasis 
added.] , 
Literally read, therefore, the second part of this ordinance Says 
that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only , 
at the whim of any police officer of that dty. The' eonstitutional 
vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It "does not 
provide for government by clearly defined laws, Hut rather for 
government by the moment-ta-moment opinions of a policeman 
on his beat." . . . Instinct with its ever-presen~ potential for 
arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties; that kind ot law 
bears the hallmark of a police state.111 
1111 Id. at 258. Another example of a precise statutel which was held a constitu-
tional regulation of the First Amend~ent right of acCess to publicly owned prop-
erty is found in Coppock v. Patterson; 272 F.Supp. 16, 20 (S.D. Miss. 1967). 
116 582 U.s. 87 (1965). 
111 Id. at 90·91. 
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The Massachusetts public trespass statute, Section 123, suffers from the 
satne overbreadth. It can be used by government employees to evict 
persons from public university property regardless of whether they 
have a right to be present. Traditionally, every effort will be made by 
the courts. to interpret statutes in a way that will render them consti-
tutional. However, Section 123, no matter how it is applied, will still 
be dangerously overbroad. 
The error of Egleson then is that the Court unconstitutionally applies 
a broad trespass statute to publicly owned and used property, and 
thereby denies defendant's First Amendment right to remain in the 
building. The decision, in effect, overlooks the distinction between the 
elements of trespass to such property and trespass to property owned 
and used privately, a distinction recognized by Massachusetts and 
federal courts. The amended Section 123, like Section 120, is unconsti-
tutional in that it grants overly broad discretion to government em-
ployees to regulate access to property which is often properly open to 
free speech and assembly activities. In view of the present need for a 
trespass statute applicable to all publicly owned property, it is un-
fortunate· that the state merely expanded Section 123, instead of taking 
the opportunity to draft a statute which would narrowly define the 
offense of trespass to publicly owned property generally, and limit the 
discretion of public officials in such situations. 
LEO BOYLE 
§IO.IO. Editorial note: Narcotic drug laws: Commonwealth v. Leis. 
In perhaps the m~st publicized decision in the 1969 SURVEY year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Leis,l upheld the con-
stitutionality of the sections o( the Commonwealth's narcotic drugs law 
regulating the possession, use and sale of marihuana.2 These sections 
were attacked on the ground that they were (1) "arbitrary and irra-
tional" because they were not aimed at the achievement of valid police 
power goals; (2) in violation of constitutional guarantees of a right to 
smoke marihuana; and (3) invalid as creating penalties which, "as 
applied to marihuana, constitute cruel and excessive punishment." 
Defendants were apprehended at Logan International Airport after 
having attempted to claim a trunk in which five pounds of marihuana 
had been secreted. They were then tried and convicted in the district 
court on complaints of possessing marihuana,8 and for conspiracy to 
violate the Narcotics Drug Law .• Upon appeal to the superior court, 
they were indicted for illegal possession of marihuana with intent to 
This editorial note was written by STEPHEN D. CLAPP, a member of the SUlI.VEY 
staff. 
§10.l0. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 97, 243 N.E.2d 898. 
2 G.L., c. 94, §§205, 21M and 217B. 
8 G.L., c. 94, §205 . 
• G.L., c. 94, §21l1A. 
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sell it unlawfully. II After the trial judge in the superior court had 
denied defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints and indictments, 
he reported the case on the question of the constitutionality of the 
statutes under the federal and state constitutions. 
The defendants contended that the laws, "as applied to marihauna, 
[go] beyond the police power of the Commonwealth in that [they are] 
not and cannot be aimed at achieving any valid legislative end, namely 
protection of the health, safety, welfare and morals,"8 and are therefore 
violative of federal and state due process guarantees. The Court replied 
by citing the familiar proposition of the presumption of the validity 
of a legislative enactment unless it can be shown that the act "cannot 
be supported upon any rational basis of fact that can reasonably be 
conceived to sustain it . . . ,"1 and by calling upon the testimony of 
the Commonwealth's experts as more than sufficient to justify legis-
lative classification of marihuana as a "narcotic" drug with many 
potentially destructive and otherwise dangerous effects. 
The defendants' contention that the right to smoke marihuana was 
constitutionally protected under both the Federal and Massachusetts 
Constitutions8 was given little sympathy by the Court. The Court noted 
that "[t]he right to smoke marihuana is not 'fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice . . . necessary to an Anglo-American re-
gime of ordered liberty,"9 that "[i]t is not within a 'zone of privacy' 
formed by 'penumbras' of the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments and the Ninth Amendment ... ";10 and concluded that the 
defendants enjoyed "no right, fundamental or otherwise, to become 
intoxicated by means of the smoking of marihuana."ll 
The next major argument of defendants took the form that the 
narcotics drug law, by "singling out" for punishment possessors of, and 
possessors with intent to sell, marihuana (while other laws permitted 
the regulated sale and use of allegedly far more dangerous substances, 
for example alcohol), was "arbitrary," and therefore violative of defen-
dants' rights to the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and also Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth.12 The Court was singularly unim-
II G.L., c. 94, §217B. . 
6 Commonwealth v. Leis, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 99, 24S N.E.2d at 901. 
1Id. at 100. 24S N.E.2d at 902. 
8 Defendants argued that Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Con-
stitution of th~ CoPlmonwealth vested them with a protected right to use 
marihuana. Article. 1 states: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain 
natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the 
right of enjoying and defending their Lives and Liberties; that of acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their 
safety and happiness." 
91969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at lOS, 24S N.E.2d at 90S. The Court cited Duncan v. 
Louisiana. 391 U.S. 145, 149-150 n.14, for this proposition. . 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See text at note 8 supra. 
58
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/13
§lO.lO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 263 
pressed by the merits of this argument, stating that it "ignore[d] the 
rules by which this contention must be tested .... "13 The fact, said 
the Court, that some of the drugs defined in G.L., c. 94, §197 are more 
dangerous than other such drugs is not sufficient to render the legis-
lative classification arbitrary and irrational, since all the drugs so 
classified are "mind-altering," and capable of producing psychotic dis-
orders of varying intensities and durations, with a consequent danger 
to the health and safety of the community. With specific reference to 
the comparison with alcohol, a substance not proscribed within the 
narcotic drug law, the Court distinguished the two substances on two 
basic grounds: First, alcohol can be regulated less restrictively because 
its abuse can be readily detected; and second, its effects upon the user 
have been the subject of such exhaustive study over such a prolonged 
period of time as to be well-known. The Court concluded that "the 
Legislature is warranted in treating this known intoxicant differently 
from marihuana, ... the effects of which are largely still unknown 
and subject to extensive dispute."14 
Defendants' last argument consisted of their contention that the 
penalties prescribed by the relevant sections of the narcotics drug law 
were cruel and excessive and thus violative of both federal and state 
constitutions.15 Although the Court noted that the fact that sentence 
had not yet been pronounced upon the defendants would probably be 
sufficient to deny them standing to have the contention adjudicated 
before the Court on this appeal,16 the Court nevertheless chose to com-
ment upon this issue. The Court stated that neither constitution re-
quired the legislature to fix a specific penalty for any given crime, and 
that it would be improvident for the Court to presume anything but a 
proper exercise of the discretion vested in the sentencing judge by the 
legislature. 
18 Commonwealth v. Leis, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1M, 24!1 N.E.2d at 904. These 
rules, cited by the Court as appearing in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78-79, are as follows: "I. ... The equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in 
the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discre-
tion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reason-
able basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some 
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made 
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 
lI. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of 
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the 
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not 
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 
14 Commonwealth v. Leis, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 105-106, 24!1 N.E.2d at 905. 
111 Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Common-
wealth states, "No magistrate or court of law, shall . • . impose excessive forms, 
or inflict cruel or unusual punishments." The Eight Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution states, "[E]xcessive fines [shall not be] imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." 
16 Commonwealth v. Leis, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 106, 24!1 N.E.2d at 906. 
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A concurring opinion by Justice Kirk stressed his agreement with the 
substantive conclusions of the Court but recorded his determination 
that the decision of the Court was unnecessary in view of the obvious 
fact that much of the evidence accumulated in the district and superior 
courts was supportive of the legitimacy of the legislative classification 
of marihuana as a dangerous narcotic drug. To entertain an appeal 
where such obvious ground existed for the presumption of the validity 
of the narcotic drug law's treatment' of marihuana was a dangerous 
incursion on the doctrine of separation of powers. 
It seems clear that as a proponent of traditional constitutional doc-
trine, Justice Kirk cannot be faulted. It is difficult to envision the 
Court unaware that defendants' own admissions in the record of the 
existence of scientific evidence contravening their contentions of the 
arbitrary nature of the classification of marihuana as a dangerous nar-
cotic drug should have precluded a judicial forum for defendants' argu-
ments. As Justice Kirk noted, once it is established that the legislative 
judgment is debatable, there can be no attack on the statute. Two pos-
sible reasons for the Court's departure from normative constitutional 
adjudication suggest themselves. Perhaps the Court fell victim to pres-
sures generated by the media to deliver an opinion on the merits. It is 
also possible that the Court utilized the opportunity afforded by the 
case to deliver an affirmation of its approval of the legislative scheme 
prescribing penalties for drug violations for the benefit of the other 
courts of the Commonwealth, many of which are presently inundated 
by cases dealing in one way or another with the drug laws. 
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